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The Internet provides users with unparalleled access to a wide variety of open
source tools. Some of the tools may be used in conjunction with others or by themselves,
often with great disruptive effect on a target. The rapid pace of discovered vulnerabilities
in computer systems, along with the cooperation of expert programmers, has given users
access to tools that lower the "entry costs" for conducting sophisticated attacks. Internet
security is dependent upon reacting effectively to continually changing modes of attack,
and is therefore almost always a step behind, in an action-reaction process.
The availability of pre-tailored attack codes gives possible enemies an avenue to
attack the US anonymously, with only a small investment of resources. However,
attackers do still need both tools and the knowledge of how to use them to carry out most
attacks. Still, more knowledge of the proper utilization of open source tools is
progressively being coded into these open source tools, opening up the ability to conduct
attacks to a higher percentage of the Internet population
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Attackers are continuously exploiting inherent weaknesses in operating systems.
Attackers place malicious code on the Internet where access to these "tools" is open to
any user. The availability of pre-tailored attack codes gives possible enemies an avenue
to attack the US anonymously and with a small amount of investment. This has led to the
popular notion that new entrants to network attack no longer need to learn the intricacies;
they can stand on the shoulders of programmers who came before them and simply use
their code. Huge strides have been made in the complexity and thoroughness of open
source tools, resulting in an unknown threat level, necessitating an open source review of
the tools.
This thesis will provide an overview of the threatening tools and techniques that
are freely available on the Internet. The reader will be exposed with a broad "state of the
union" of the capabilities of the attack tools and the consequences of their use.
Discussion of the evolution and future trends of attacks will be included.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What is the future of open source tools? i.e. What are the trends and what do
they point to for future open source attacks?
2. How can distributed networks be used for different types of attack and defense?
C. METHODOLOGY
This thesis centers around the survey of advanced open source tools and
techniques available on the Internet. Selection criteria is based upon the level of success
and the sophistication of the tools. Analysis considers how these tools are used in
coordination and how they might be used in the future. A trend toward distributed
network attack as a major new method is demonstrated by the recent high profile attacks
earlier this year: the possibility of employing a similar system by different entities is
explored.
D. ORGANIZATION
This thesis is organized into five chapters, from basic theory to the findings of
future trends. Following this introduction is a chapter on Vulnerabilities and why tools
work in a general way. Included in the chapter is a discussion of network organization
and the inherent weaknesses that are being exploited. Chapter IQ discusses three basic
types of attack methods and the necessary actions an attacker would have to take for each
one. Chapter IV is a survey of current tools available on the Internet today and three
scenarios involving current tools. Chapter V outlines future trends and a few
hypothetical scenarios. Included in chapter five is a findings section, summarizing the
major points of this study. This study has one Appendix which is the results of a survey
to determine 50 of the most popular security tools.
II. VULNERABILITIES
We build our computers the way we build our cities, over time
without a plan, on top of ruins (Ullman, 1998).
This chapter outlines the vulnerabilities that exist in applications and protocols
and how they are exploited. It is not the intention of this chapter to give a comprehensive
background of all the vulnerabilities and the history behind them, but rather to expose the
general reasons why they are "hardwired" into systems, and are still being discovered.
The basics of how computers communicate are also discussed to help expose the
antecedents of most Internet vulnerabilities. Finally, the last section discusses how
coordinated attack tools exploit the combination of weaknesses in the Internet and
applications/Operating Systems.
A. VULNERABILITY EXPLOITATION LIFECYCLE
A few software vulnerabilities account for the majority of
successful attacks because attackers are opportunistic...they count on
organizations not fixing the problems, and they often attack
indiscriminately, by scanning the Internet for vulnerable systems (Sans
Institute, 2000).
Vulnerability is defined as a weakness that an attacker exploits to conduct
unauthorized actions (Howard, 1997, p. 5). Vulnerabilities might be incorporated into the
code of an application or the organization of a system: they could be simple oversights,
intentionally coded/designed weaknesses, or just poorly written code. When a weakness























Figure 1. Vulnerability Exploitation Cycle (From Ref.CERT/SEI, 2000)
Figure 1 shows the Vulnerability Exploitation Lifecycle on the Internet. At the
beginning, expert engineers or programmers discover a weakness through their
experiences or jobs. Whatever their intent, they program crude code to either test for this
weakness or exploit it. Soon either the coders themselves, or someone who has been able
to put his hands on the code or new idea, begin to use it on systems throughout the
Internet. The exploit is successful because the majority of sites are not yet aware of their
weakness. It is at this stage that advisories from the various Computer Emergency
Response Teams (CERT) begin to be published as the new attack spreads. The period
between the advertisement and the patch by a vendor is highly variable, some patches are
deployed within a few days while others are deployed in a month (Fithen, 2000).
At this point the tool is still technical: just having the code is not enough to use it
properly; the user still needs to understand the inner workings of the target system and
might have to "walk" the tool through to the end using other tools. Eventually, for either
prestige or out of good intention, an expert will code it into a stand-alone tool or even a
Graphical User Interface (GUI) -based application. The new code by the expert gives the
tool the push it needs into the mainstream "script kiddie" community and the tool's use
becomes widespread. Now the new users do not need to know the underlying code, they
can "stand on the shoulders" of the experts before them, benefiting from the expert's skill
in coding, to attack a system that otherwise they wouldn't be able to compromise.
Eventually a patch or attack solution has wide enough distribution that the fixes
stop the new attack. The successful use of the tool wanes sharply and attackers begin to
look elsewhere for a new vulnerability.
Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability
A B C A
Figure 2. Vulnerability Lifecycle (From Ref.CERT/SEI, 2000)
Vulnerabilities are never completely eradicated on the Internet, and they are
constantly being probed (McHugh, 2000). Figure 2 illustrates that in many instances the
vulnerability has resurgence on the Internet after the initial decline. As the exploit
becomes less notorious, and a new exploit is in the press, those responsible for system
security might overlook the old vulnerability in future upgrades. All the solutions to old
vulnerabilities have to be incorporated into security measures in the future. For example,
Microsoft Corporation is up to Service pack 6 for Windows NT; it incorporates every
vulnerability in service pack 3-5 inclusive.
One more factor in the renewed life of vulnerabilities is the massive rate of new
users and systems. Vulnerabilities have an ever-expanding new range of computers to try
their attacks on; the Internet is currently growing at 35% a year. "(McGuire, 2000).
Compounding this problem is the practice of static IP address designation for the new
DSL and ISDN customers. Static addresses for private citizens could be thought of as an
easy target since security measures on private computers are hardly a huge concern.
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Somewhere on the Internet it's almost a given that there are computers that are vulnerable
to almost any tool, it's just a matter of finding them (Fithen, 2000). Private citizens do
not spend the same amount of time on security than other types of groups because,
"people don't consider computers as active instruments - rather like TV's and appliances"
(Konda, 2000).
Statistically speaking, script kiddies and hackers have a huge chance of success of
being able to find a weak system on the Internet. With well over 500 known
vulnerabilities, sysadmins have no idea which ones to defend against and cannot keep up
with the pace of the new vulnerability advances. "Sysadmins are overwhelmed by issues
they face - it only takes one mistake. Time and tools are on the intruder's side to find the
one weakness you have" (Carpenter, 2000).
B. APPLICATION/OS VULNERABILITIES
Running system software straight from the box can be an invitation
to hackers, as packaged software is often delivered with initial
configuration settings [that] leave systems wide open to attack (Denning,
1999).
Applications have a wide range of vulnerabilities. Applications get more and
more complex with every iteration, and the amount of code grows exponentially. Where
once a few people could understand the totality of the code for a given application,
modern applications have well over 20 million lines of code; groups are responsible for
the security of only their specific aspect of an application. Modern code writing
companies additionally don't feel any real pressure to make applications more secure
(Longstaff, 2000). People demand that applications are easy, cheap, and quick over
slower, more secure systems.
Computer companies develop their own code with known vulnerabilities and still
place them out in the marketplace in "Beta" format. In the rush to be first to marketplace,
they farm out their testing to the general public. If someone finds a flaw, he is under no
real obligation to report it. A company under market pressure sometimes will fix as
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many flaws as it feels necessary to guarantee only the proper running of the application,
and end any improvement there. A common solution is to produce patches, which might
fail to get the exposure they need.
Additionally, there is a great demand for backward compatibility in software.
Backward compatibility forces some kernels to adopt vulnerable stances to handling
security measures for processes and access to resources. Known vulnerabilities are still
incorporated into new code to provide backward compatibility due to market demands.
Applications are usually shipped "out of the box" in the least secure mode
possible. Many features of new products are vulnerabilities, such as Java and ActiveX,
but rather than shipping products in the most restrictive mode, the onus for security is
placed on the consumer. Sysadmins and civilian consumers have more emphasis to get
the new product working rather than ensuring it is secure - and once it is working are
loath to touch it.
Applications and Operating Systems contain vulnerabilities because security has
never been the main concern for their development. Companies are more concerned to
match market driven forces of speed and ease-of-use because people are not historically
willing to pay extra for security. Vulnerabilities will always exist due to the extremely
large amount of code in products and the impossibility of being able to test it completely.
Coders discover and gather these vulnerabilities, incorporate them into tools, and
eventually form them into self-executed programs that are easily used by any potential
attacker.
C. INTERNET VULNERABILITY
The Internet, like software, is vulnerable because security was not an overriding
factor in designing computer communications. Like applications, emphasis has always
been on ease of use, data integrity and speed. At the beginning of the Internet Age, the
integrity of sent data was the main goal; while in modern times, the consumers pushing
the marketplace are far more interested in ease of use and low prices. Vulnerabilities on
the Internet are present due to the lack of attention to security and how the protocols are
implemented.
1. Short History of the Internet
The Internet was originally called the ARPANET, which was started in 1969 by
the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense (DOD).
The ARPANET'S main emphasis was the reliability and flexibility of the connections
between computers, not security, and therefore very little thought was given to restriction
of information flows. What little security that was present was mainly there to ensure
connectivity (since every attempt to start a session was assumed to be legitimate). At that
time, maintaining a reliable connection was very difficult between remote sites, and this
much-needed reliability was one of the main emphases in the various protocol designs.
There were many reasons to trust other computers; computers were extremely
expensive and maintenance intensive, and only highly endowed agencies were able to
own them. Concurrently, access to a computer was almost proof enough of one's validity.
In addition, the ARPANET consisted of universities and government sites where almost
everyone knew everyone else: trust was not an issue in these small professional circles.
This open policy continued as the ARPANET grew and more features such as
email, newsgroups and telnet services were added. Eventually the ARPANET proved to
be more valuable as a communication tool than an end unto itself, as more people shared
unrelated research (to ARPANET) over the net. By 1989 over 100,000 sites were
connected to the ARPANET and the name was officially changed to the Internet.
By 1989, the small community flavor was gone. The first real virus, the Morris
Worm exposed the impact of malicious code by spreading to roughly 10 percent of all the
computers connected to the Internet in 1988 (Sullivan, 2000).
2. Packet Switching
The basis of computer communications assists in explaining why weaknesses are
inherent on today's computer networks. In a perfect world, every computer would be
point-to-point connected to every other computer with a dedicated wire and an Internet
would not be needed. Of course this is impractical for two reasons: building dedicated
lines between two devices thousands of miles apart would be extremely expensive, and
every device does not necessarily need to be connected to every other device. (Stallings,
2000, p. 9) Therefore some type of switching needs to take place by all the other devices
on the network where the resources are shared.
One of the earliest solutions was circuit switching. This was used for many years,
and in some locations still is used in telephone networks. For a period of communication
time allotted, two devices such as telephones are logically connected together over a
shared line. Circuit switching has very rapid data transfer since there is no delay across
the network. The downside is that the other devices logically separated from the network
by the dedicated line of the two connected devices cannot communicate with any other
devices.
The natural solution to circuit switching was to take advantage of the lulls when
the two devices were not talking. Packet switching allows the line to be shared by
multiple devices at once. The data is separated into small packets instead of a steady
stream of data. These packets travel the nodes between the two devices, and not
necessarily over the same nodes either. The connection can be used much more
efficiently than circuit switching since communication can take place constantly.
This is one basis for the weakness in computer communication. Since
communication is not constant over dedicated lines, a series of protocols has to be used to
encode messages. The protocols encode and decode these messages, sending them off
using different protocols that have inherent vulnerabilities.
3. TCP/IP
The transition to TCP/IP was perhaps the most important event that
would take place in the development of the Internet for years to come.
After TCP/IP was installed, the network could branch anywhere; the
protocols made the transmission of data from one network to another a
trivial task (Hafher, 1998).
TCP/IP is the protocol for the World Wide Web and stands for Transmission
Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol, and is actually two different protocols working in
unison. IP is the infrastructure that separates each individual node with a unique
address, similar to a postal address. TCP works on top of this infrastructure, separating
the data into "packets" that can be routed to their final destinations. When TCP/IP was
adopted, along with the Domain Name System, "every address would include levels of
information representing, in progression, a smaller, more specific part of the network
address." (Hafher, 1998)
TCP/IP has been adopted because it was one of the original protocols that
incorporated a method of error checking and is very reliable over multiple systems and
architectures. It has some very distinct characteristics, outlined in several RFCs about
how one starts, continues, and completes a connection with another computer. RFC971
























Figure 3 gives a simple example of how data is prepared to be routed using
TCP/IP and shows the different headers that are placed upon base data. This is how the
Internet works: starting with the application data level, TCP, IP and the Network level
protocols all add extra "routing" instructions to ensure the data reached its proper
destination. Within each header are specific instructions for each layer, like envelopes
within envelopes. When the packet reaches the other end, each layer strips off its
respective header, using the stored information to pass off to the next layer. The packet is
"self-sufficient" in that all instructions are incorporated into the packet and it is sent off
by itself. Once it goes outside its security zone, the packet is vulnerable to being altered,
captured, or spoofed. Of course, data fields in the headers can be altered on purpose at
conception as well.
Bit: 16 19 31
Version IHL Type ofService Total Length
Identification Flags Fragment Offset 2s
it





Figure 4. IP Header (From Ref. Bernstein, 2000)
Figure 4 shows an IP header, which provides information to routers to help send
the data to its destination. The most notable fields in the header are the source and
destination address fields. Many IPv4 routers accept EP headers implicitly and do not
check for validity, and anyone wishing to change the source address to any 32-bit number
is welcome. This weakness is the starting point of many attackers wishing to hide their
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identity. One could also change the other fields, such as Fragment Offset, to any value
one wishes, which causes another error from malformed packets.
Bit: 10 16












Figure 5. TCP Header (From Ref. Bernstein, 2000)
Figure 5 is the template TCP header that is placed in front of the IP header.
Similar to the IP header, TCP adds more specificity to the packet in the form of outlining
the communication ports used, sequence number of the communication stream, and
several signal flags. Like the IP header, the TCP header can be manipulated to cause
errors or induce the target computer to act in certain ways.
4. Examples of Common Exploits in TCP/IP (and why they work)
Two of the most common TCP/IP exploits give a good example ofhow altering a
few bits in a header can have malicious consequences. They also reveal how inherent
trust is taken advantage of and how protocols can be used against themselves.
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a. Initial Handshake
Many administrative and malicious tools on the Internet take advantage of
the handshake sequence of TCP/IP. When two computers try to talk over the Internet
using TCP/IP, a "three way handshake" is initiated. Each phase of this handshake is
vulnerable to information gathering, spoofing, or denial of service tools.
To open a dialogue between computers, several packets of data need to be
sent in a certain order between them. The source computer sends an initial packet
requesting a dialogue, which is signified by a SYN flag in the TCP header. The target
computer sends an ACK and SYN flag in return to signal that it is ready to receive data
and to go ahead and do it. The source computer then sends ACK and starts sending data.
If a computer sends a SYN signal and loses its connection, the target
computer will still send its reply and wait for a response. This is a weakness where a
computer could "time out" a target computer by simply sending a constant stream of
SYNs. The target computer will wait for the final handshake for each SYN packet
received until its buffer is filled, thereby blocking any legitimate traffic to the target
computer. This is known as a SYN flood attack, a type of Denial of Service (DoS).
In another exploit, a computer can send connection attempts to every port
on a target computer and log any replies, effectively scanning and enumerating the
computer. Even a negative response can help determine the characteristics of a
computer.
Taking advantage of the initial handshake uses a trusted relationship in a
malicious way. The target computer is simply trying its best to connect to what it
perceives as an honest attempt to communicate.
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b. Spoofing
As mentioned earlier, one of the easiest weaknesses of TCP/IP to exploit
is to change your identity. This weakness is taken advantage of by many exploits on the
Internet and is the first step in hiding your identity to an Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) or the authorities. Instead of changing your identity to a random IP address, one
can assume the identity of one side of a legitimate communication.
Spoofing also involves trying to hijack a session from another legitimate
connection. TCP uses the Sequence Number to keep track of an open communication
session. If one can guess the next semi-randomized number of the sequence, one could
jump in the middle of a legitimate conversation and hijack it.
The main vulnerability in TCP/IP is the implicit trust in the system. There
is little validation of headers, which opens the door to several types of vulnerabilities and
their exploits. To put it simply, "host names, IP addresses, and hardware addresses are
not sufficient to create any basis for trust on the Internet"(Atkins, 1997), due to the ease
of being able to modify them.
D. NETWORK ORGANIZATION
The structure of networks also has vulnerabilities that can be taken advantage of.
The Internet is divided into domains and each domain is given a range of IP addresses
that it can use. Each domain also has an IP address that is owned by the router. The
router address is used to send and receive packets for the domain that it represents.
Routers use common commands for maintenance purposes. For example, it is
necessary from time to time for the router to talk to every node that it is responsible for,
to keep track of every computer. Instead of methodically sending packets to every single
computer or node on the domain, the router uses the broadcast IP address - sending the
same message to every computer at once. Usually this is a ping, which requests a signal
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back. The "broadcast" ping, originally implemented for network control, has been
converted into an intelligence gathering device and an attack tool by hackers. Many early
developed commands still widely used for LAN maintenance have been subverted by
malicious code in ways the original designers never imagined.
1. Coordinated/Distributed Attacks
...there is essentially nothing a site can do with currently available
technology to prevent becoming a victim of, for example, a coordinated
network flood (CERT, 1999).
A coordinated attack is an attack that uses several computers in conjunction to
exploit a vulnerability. Coordinated attacks also are used to magnify certain attacks, such
as a broadcast attack. Many coordinated attacks and distributed attacks take advantage of
vulnerabilities in both applications and the Internet together.
One of the simplest coordinated attacks is a distributed denial of service. Instead
of using a single computer to flood a target, multiple computers are used in conjunction
to greatly increase the amount of malicious packets. In addition, if the computers
spoofed their IP source addresses, the target computer would not know who the true
attacker was. This example uses the network vulnerability of the broadcast ping and the
IP protocol vulnerability together to form an indefensible attack. In this example, the
target domain has no way to stop the exploit, since every source address is false. The









B has rendered B
unable
to repiy to A.
Attacker
Figure 6. A Coordinated Attack (From Ref. Northcutt, 1999)
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Coordinated attacks can also be used to attack a system from two different
directions, taking advantage of the vulnerabilities in the communication protocol between
two computers. Coordinated attacks can be used to manipulate trusted relationships
between computers. As shown in Figure 6, one could both spoof one computer and
flood another at the same time to spoof a connection. Kevin Mitnick, easily the most
famous hacker of the 90's, used this coordinated attack to gain his notoriety.
E. CONCLUSION
System administrators out there... are aware that security holes
exist in their systems, but they see the alerts coming out daily and are
overwhelmed by sheer numbers (Lemos, 2000).
Internet and application vulnerabilities are always existent. New vulnerabilities
are always being discovered and coded, and unfortunately, "threats are winning faster
than defense" (Shimeall, 2000). Vulnerabilities are present due to the assumed "trust
everyone" relationship between computers, the complexity of modern code, and the way
the Internet was originally designed.
Additionally, new systems and applications are put in place with safety defaults
turned off. They are designed with speed and ease of use rather than security in mind.
Patches to known vulnerabilities are not put in place soon enough, but even with timely
patches, "sites are almost always taken over by known attack scripts that should have
been secured" (McHugh, 2000) due to other sysadmin's priorities.
Fortunately, several high profile attacks in 1999 and 2000 have raised the level of
interest in security. The public and government are gaining more interest in the subject
with headlines such as "Its Time for Uncle Sam to Foil a Cyber Pearl Harbor" (Pinkerton,
2000) and the myriad of articles surrounding the DoS attacks against the e-vendors and
the "I Love You" Worm. The government has also developed the "National Plan for
Information Systems Protection" which is a partnership plan between the government and
business to confront security issues more seriously.
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Many feel that exposure of vulnerabilities will make the Internet and applications
stronger, "just as our immune system is strengthened by exposure to disease"(Markoff,
2000). Weak systems will be exposed and taken down while the strong will adapt. Every
computer system has vulnerabilities. True security might depend on making yourself that
much tougher than your neighbor and utilize the "Low-Hanging Fruit Paradigm"
(Northcutt, 1999).
Finally, despite all the code and vulnerabilities, social engineering still remains
one of the most vulnerable parts of a system. An insider, weak passwords, and not
enforcing physical/logical security measures all negate any security posture.
In conclusion, the Internet community is dealing with the vulnerabilities inherent
in all of the protocol levels. Malicious coders take advantage of the "assumed trust"
relationship between computers. New vulnerabilities will always have a short advantage
over legacy systems. But now with the new interest in security and the new measures
that are slowly being developed, such as IPv6, security will inherit the same importance
as simplicity and speed one day. However, constant vigilance is still needed at all levels
to decrease the presence and effect of vulnerabilities as the foundations of the Internet are
slow to change.
17
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III. METHODS OF THE ATTACKER
"We often give our enemies the means for our own destruction" - Aesop.
This chapter explains how an attacker might use open source tools to select and
attack a given target. Three popular methods are described: (1) Exploit, (2) Trojan
Horse, and (3) Denial of Service. While there is no one overriding way an attacker can
attack, by investigating all three of these methods, one may infer much about most of the
other forms of computer attack. This is not a comprehensive guide of the best tools on
the Internet, but rather a sample of what an attacker can download today off the Internet
and what they can do with them. The chapter concludes with methods of finding open
source tools and instruction.
This chapter is organized so that the reader becomes familiar with three types of
attack. First an overview of the attack is presented, followed by a more detailed view of a
specific tool that performs tasks needed in the attack. The tools have been picked based
on their popularity in the major hacker/cracker sites and upon the personal experience of
the author. The difficulty in providing examples of open source code is the specificity of
each tool: most tools target only specific operating systems, mainly in the case of "end-
game" tools: the buffer overflows and application/OS exploits.
The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate how open source tools can be used in an
integrated way to gather information and complete an attack. Most tools imply a non-
trivial amount of knowledge to use (Nelson, 1999). Simply having access to the tools
does not equal the ability to use them. Knowing how to use the information from the
tools is a necessary skill. Just downloading these "example" tools and blindly using them
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doesn't guarantee anything; however, in the right hands, a system can be used against
itself to reveal information that otherwise would remain hidden, or to find vulnerabilities
that the manufacturer either accidentally overlooked or implemented into the code.
The chapter concludes with a section on how to find open source tools. Rather
than give an exhausting, easily outdated list of the most popular tools, the section
discusses where the open source tools reside on the Internet.
A. NECESSARY STEPS FOR AN EXPLOIT ATTACK
An exploit attack is defined as an attack to gain root status or the ability to
execute code at root level on a remote system (McClure, 1999). According to several
sources both in print and online, there are roughly eight steps needed to complete an
exploit attack (Maximum Security, 1998). The steps are: (1) Footprinting, (2) Scanning,
(3) Enumeration, (4) Gaining Access, (5) Escalating Privilege, (6) Pilfering, (7) Covering
Tracks, and (8) Back Doors (McClure, 1999). The first four steps involve three areas:
finding, targeting, and attacking an objective. The scope of this paper is restricted to the
first four steps, as after gaining access, each step is highly specific to the system being
attacked.
1. Footprinting
[Sam Spade] is a multitalented network query tool, with some
extra utilities built in to handle spam mail. It provides the typical utilities
such as ping, traceroute, whois, finger, etc. (PCWorld, 2000).
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The first step of any attack is determining a target of interest. This could be any
system that has a particular known weakness that is searchable, or a specific target.
Footprinting is the easiest of all the steps; it is basic intelligence gathering on a target
generally using legal and accepted search tools (McClure, 1999). There are several open
source tools that help determine basic open information on a target.
Footprinting can start with a query as simple as a Yahoo, Hotbot, or Google open
search entry and these usually will bring up the homepage of the target. For example,
entering "Naval Postgraduate School" will return the www.nps.navy.mil homepage on
any search engine. There are also several hacker search engines such as Dogpile.com,
which allows one to check several webcrawlers at once. All of these engines give the
attacker the starting location of the target, the first step in isolating the zone of interest.
From the homepage of the target, one can use any browser such as Internet
Explorer (EE), to find an IP address of your target by resolving the Domain Name System
(DNS) name to an IP address. For example: the DNS entry for www.nps.navy.mil
resolves to 131.120.251.13. By using another public site, ipcheck.dragonstar.net, a
service that resolves IP addresses, reveals that the Naval Postgraduate School has
responsibility for a whole Class B network: all the numbers from 131.120.0.0 to
131.120.255.255, roughly 65,000 IP addresses. An attacker now knows what range of IP
addresses he needs to focus on.
Another useful public footprinting tool is the "whois" feature - every registrar
(such as Network Solutions Corp.) is responsible for listing system administrator
(sysadmin) contact information for public access (www.crsnic.net/whois). The sysadmin
information usually includes the address and phone number of the domain site (where the
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computers are located) and the sysadmin name and number. In addition, any extra
domain names are listed, which can reduce the number of addresses that need to be
checked by an attacker. Attackers use the information to get an idea of a geographical
location and to get a range of what IP numbers they have to investigate. (Bernstein, 2000)
This is a common social engineering break-off point, where hackers would use the name
of the sysadmin to try and trick a common worker to reveal a password or userid, or even
set up an account (Littman, 1996).
Many open source footprinting programs include multiple tools and features. One
of the more popular open source tools is called "Sam Spade", which can be found at
www.samspade. org . The advantage of Sam Spade is its Graphic User Interface (GUI)
that can be set up to systematically get information using a whole range of tools at once.
Included in the software is an extensive help file and online help page, to explain any
results one might have questions on, and instruct different methods of footprinting
(Atkins, 1999).
Footprinting is the starting point for any attack. With footprinting tools, an
attacker finds the domain of the target, the range of IP addresses in the domain, the
sysadmin POC with name and number, and the routes the line of communication goes
through to reach the target. Like a burglar "casing" a house, footprinting determines
where the house is, who is responsible for its security, and the location and number of
windows/doors into the house (McClure, 1999).
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2. Scanning
...[T]he 'to current resident' brute force style of bulk mail is an
almost perfect parallel [of scanning]...just stick a message in every
mailbox and wait for the responses to trickle back. We send a blizzard of
packets for various protocols, and we deduce which services are listening
from the responses we receive (or don't receive) - Fyodor (2000).
Scanning tools are used when you have determined the rough outline of your
target from footprinting. The scanning step is used to determine which computers are
"alive" and which services the computer on the domain is using. These tools are used to
get an exact center: determining the types of operating systems and the various ports that
are open to attack (Bernstein, 2000). Open source scanning tools use both frontal loud
attacks and subtle quiet attacks to get information.
TCP and UDP services can be scanned on a remote computer by sending false and
legitimate packets. By taking advantage of the three-way handshake for each TCP port,
an attacker can determine which services are running on the target. There are many
methods of scanning a computer for different services, and each can discover a small bit
about the target computer, even whether it answers the scanning packets or not (Fyodor,
2000). With a summary of open TCP/UDP ports and how the computer reacts, an
attacker can determine the operating system and applications. By knowing the details of
the system an attacker is up against, he can search the Internet for the known
vulnerabilities for that particular system or applications.
Scanning can be done by brute force: every computer has 65,535 ports, and each
can be assigned an application. The majority of ports under 1024 have already been
assigned; for example, "port 80" is the http port, the Internet port. Every computer that
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surfs the web has "port 80" open. "Nmap" can systematically determine all the ports
open on a target and use the results to determine the services running on the computer.
The most powerful and popular scanning tool developed is "nmap", produced by
a person who calls himself Fyodor (Bernstein, 2000). Nmap can be used on Linux and
Microsoft systems to systematically scan a range of IP addresses and ports. Nmap has
been described as "one of the most powerful information-gathering tools available ...to
both attacker and defender" (Northcutt, 1999). Nmap can be scripted to scan in different
techniques to fool Intrusion Detection Systems (EDS) (Fyodor, 2000). Using these two
features of nmap together, an attacker can discover the target's router or operating system
while hiding the scanning process.
In conclusion, if footprinting is "casing the joint", then scanning would be the
rattling of all the doors and windows after driving to the target. Scanning a target tests
every port to determine which services are running on the target. Attackers use scanning
as a stepping-stone, to focus attempts on finding services that are running on the target.
3. Enumeration
[Nmap] provides all the information needed for a well-informed,
full-fledged, precisely targeted assault on a network. Such an attack
would have a high probability of success and would likely go unnoticed
(Northcutt, 1999).
Enumeration determines the group and user structure of the target domain or
spotlights a weakness in the security layout of the target system. The key to enumeration
is to find ways to get access to a root level process, which allows an attacker to run or set
up any code that they wish. This step discovers structural weaknesses in the defensive
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matrix of the target domain by determining the specific applications or hardware being
used by the target. The point is to gather enough information about the computer so
attacks can be specific to the current services.
Perhaps the easiest way to obtain a simple enumeration on a target system is to
use the www netcraft.com public site. Netcraft will enumerate any site as best as it can -
and give the user the target's browser application and system platform version if possible.
Nmap can also be used to enumerate a target system. Based on responses and target ports
open, nmap can give its "best bet" of what the attacker is up against. For example, "port
139" (netbios) and "port 80" (http) together usually indicate a Windows machine.
One of Nmap's main value as a tool is its internal database of responses that
provides a script kiddie what type of system is on the other side. Nmap parses and
computes the target by the algorithms that were coded by Fyodor, the programmer of
nmap. The answer can be used to give an attacker a starting place to look for known
open source vulnerabilities for that particular platform and the applications it runs.
An attacker enumerates a target to find more detailed information on a system.
Using enumeration tools provides an attacker with several starting-off points to attempt
gaining access. Knowing the version and type of applications, allows one to search for
publicly known weaknesses on those applications.
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4. Gain Access
Once the target has been enumerated, an exploit is used on the vulnerabilities that
are associated with the applications and/or operating system. Finding the exploits
involves searching the Internet for tools specifically related to the target. There are a
plethora of techniques and tools available on the net to gain entry, including buffer
overflows, operating system errors, application flaws, etc. The meaning of "success" of
these exploits could range from being able to read a locally held file to owning a root
level account on a domain server, with free reign on all the organization's resources. The
tools and techniques used to gain access get very specific for each platform and purpose,
as many vulnerabilities are usually effective only to specific applications.
For purposes of demonstration, a buffer overflow will be described. Buffer
overflows are some of the most common exploits on the Internet (Network ICE
Corporation, 2000). A buffer overflow is "what happens when you try to stuff more data
into a buffer than it can handle" (www.jargon.net). In other words, it attacks a lack of
bounds, checking on the size of input being stored in a buffer array. In simple terms, it is
a response that fills a memory location beyond what it can handle. For example, if a
computer asks for the year on a form, where a short integer and a response of four digits
is expected, the attacker will instead provide an overwhelming response of 150 numbers.
Buffer overflows only work in code that does not check the boundaries of its arrays.
By writing past the end of the allocated space, the attacker can make changes to
the memory stored next to the array on the stack. If the code is written poorly without
error correction, the 150 numbers will swamp the executable code into allowing the user
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to point a pointer into alternate memory location. As shown in Figure 1, in the other
memory location the attacker will have special code that he wants to implement. Most of
the time the hacker will introduce code to start a "shell", which allows the attacker to run
processes as root. Buffer overflows are not easy to find, and are usually the result of
intensive reverse engineering to find the exact offset to introduce onto the stack (Cowan,
2000). The open source tools on the Internet are usually restricted to pointing out where















Figure 7. Buffer Overflow (From Ref. Cowan, 2000)
One recent buffer overflow, introduced on 18 JULY 2000, specifically targets MS
Outlook and Outlook Express Email Clients, two very popular applications that Microsoft
has incorporated into their "Office suite" bundle. If one has enumerated that the target
system uses MS Outlook, this exploit might be able to be used. (This exploit can be found
at packetstorm.security.com/0007-exploits/outlook.advisory.txt.) This buffer overflow
exploit advisory outlines the method in "smashing" the stack by entering "an
exceptionally long string directly proceeding the GMT specification in the Date header
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field." The buffer overflow occurs when the target user previews or views any email in
MS Outlook. The exploit also gives an example of using this overflow, demonstrating
how one can force the target computer to download and execute a file from the web. One
can easily see how a malicious attacker can do anything within the target system that has
this vulnerability (CERT, 2000).
With any open source exploit, the attacker is hoping that the security manager has
missed the patch for the vulnerability or has been too busy to upgrade the software. If the
security manager has been on the ball, the attacker will simply search for a new open
source tool that can affect the target system in another way, using the information
gathered in the enumeration step.
5. Conclusion to Exploit Attack
Exploit attacks can take many different forms, buffer overflows only being one.
Just having the tool does not guarantee success: knowledge of how to implement the
information given after each step makes the attacker dangerous. Many of the steps can be
combined, as shown with nmap in the scanning and enumeration phase.
Once the attacker has gained entry, there are many steps he/she needs to make
which involve setting up a user account, hiding their tracks, and making a back door so
they don't have to hack in again. Each of these is highly specific for each individual
operating system and not a focus of this thesis. There are many open source tools and
advice on the Internet where one can learn and be taught to discover how to do those
things.
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There are also several tools on the Internet that combine many steps at once, such
as "SATAN" and "ISS". Both scan and find weaknesses in systems automatically
without an attacker needing to do extensive research. Many attackers will not use these
"multipurpose" tools because of the large signature they leave on the targeted system.
Both SATAN and ISS are very popular and all the new IDSs can quickly identify when
they are being scanned by them (Maximum Security, 2000). To remain hidden, attackers
use the slow stealthy methods that keep them "below the radar screen" of the targeted
system's security measures. Sometimes the easiest tools to use have the most popular
signatures because of their notoriety. Knowing the intricacies of the computer languages
and commands outweighs the advantage of access to the newest tools.
B. TROJAN HORSE ATTACK
Trojan Horse attacks can be viewed as a shortcut to an exploit attack. Rather than
breaking into a system, an attacker can trick a target user into running a malicious
program. Trojan Horse attacks refer to the battle tactic of the Greeks at the end of the
siege of Troy outlined in The War At Troy, written by Quintus. The modern Trojan
Horses are based on the same premise - the recipient is getting more than they bargained
for. Trojan Horses are extra code, piggy-backing on legitimate code to gain entry into
another system. No drawn out scanning and enumeration are required since the person
fooled runs the malicious code under his access level on the system. Trojan Horses are a
method of gaining access - only the type of code that the attacker chooses to run limits
the range of damage.
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For this chapter, Trojan Horses refer to the practice of installing a stand-alone
Remote Administration Tool (RAT) program. A RAT is an extra "hidden" process on a
target computer that allows an outsider access. Every time the target computer is started,
the hidden RAT is started as well, opening a port on the computer to allow an attacker to
send any command to the target computer. To infect a system, an attacker has to get the
target user to run the seemingly innocent Trojan Horse application, and then the RAT
program will automatically burrow itself into the operating system.
The RAT Trojan Horses are composed of two parts: the server and the client.
Since the attacker will be communicating with the server, it is placed on the target. The
attacker uses the client to talk to the server(s). The attacker attempts to load the server on
as many systems as possible. Communication between the client and server is by TCP/IP
on an attacker-defined port number.
Trojan Horses can also be used to ensure access to a compromised system. Some
attackers set up Trojan Horses and then hide them in the system and wait a month or
longer before using the attack program to ensure that the Trojan Horse is incorporated
into the monthly system-wide backup. In case of being discovered while using the
system later on, their Trojan Horse will be reinstalled with the back up (Dittrich, 2000).
1. Trojan Horse Walk Through
...[Sub7 is] the most popular [and]... is the most dangerous Trojan,
with several powerful "hacker" capabilities. (Network ICE Corporation,
2000)
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Every Trojan Horse attack comes down to getting the code onto the target. By far
the easiest method is to attach the malicious Trojan Horse to an innocent looking email.
One of the oldest Trojan Horse spreading methods was animated holiday programs that
would install the malicious code while the user played a simple holiday game or watched
a holiday animation (Bernstein, 2000). For the majority, an unknown executable file
from anyone not completely trusted would be deleted without running. However, even
with all the press warnings, it would still be a very effective method, proving once again
that the weakest link is always the user^Finley, 2000).
There are three popular Trojan Horse RAT programs on the Internet: Back
Orifice, NetBus, and Sub7. To describe a Trojan Horse server/client program, Sub7 and
several "masking" programs are discussed. Because the main concern of an attacker who
is restricting himself to an email attack would be hiding the true nature of an attachment,
several tools must be used to change the nature of the malicious file.
The Sub7 file can be found at its homepage {http://subseven.slak. org) . It is a
relatively small application - 1.35MB that includes the client, the server and an
additional server editor. The installation file that goes onto the target, the server, is
373KB - easily hidden in a much larger video file. Included at the Sub7 site are explicit
instructions on how to use the product and several suggestions on how to successfully
infect a target. One of the methods suggested is to use separate programs to hide the true
1 The person who made the "I Love You Too" worm, named after the more famous "I Love You" worm,
supposedly invented it just to showcase that even though there was wide spread warnings not to open
suspicious email attachments, people still did in droves, even after being infected with the "I Love You"
worm.
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nature of the server. The first is called "joiner" that an attacker can use to attach the
server to another file.
A programmer who calls himself "Blade" developed joiner. The site
(nnvvv. come. to/soul4blade ) has several Trojan programs as well which can be used in
conjunction with Sub7. Now that many users have exposure to Trojan Horses, Blade has
developed a tool called "tHing" that is only 8k large, and it basically creates a very small
opening to allow the bigger Sub7 Trojan to be installed at a later date. The joiner
program attaches the server to any file an attacker chooses, including sound, photo, and
video files. After using joiner, the file is changed to an executable and a new icon is
placed on the attachment.
To change the icon, an attacker can use the Microangelo98 program from
(www.impactsoft.com) - a free icon-editing tool to change the appearance of a file.
Finally, the attacker sends the trojaned video to a target as an attachment hoping it is
opened out of curiosity. If sent to enough people, the attacker is almost certain to have
one or two open the video.
Upon opening, the server attaches itself and "hides" in the system registry, the
heart of the operating system. The server can be also configured to reinstall every time
the computer reboots making it difficult to get rid of, and it can also change its name to
mimic a vital program in the operating system. Very few untrained users would erase a
file named "Winkrnl.dH" - or even know that this could pass for "Windows Kernel
Dynamic Linked Library" - a bogus file (Bernstein, 2000).
The attacker uses the client to scan the targets to determine if the server has been
loaded. The server and client communicate on a high numbered port, well into the
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1000's, thus evading the well used ports and services. Usually the first step of a
successful Trojan Horse RAT attack is to close off access to anybody else trolling the
Internet for the same open ports. As discussed in soul4blade.com, there are several tools
that just scan for certain open ports that designate a Back Orifice or Sub7 RAT servers.
C. DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK
Distributed Denial of Service Attacks have recently emerged as
one of the most newsworthy, if not greatest, weakness of the Internet
(Todd, 2000).
A Denial of Service (DoS) is an attack that stops the function of a computer or a
system from communicating with the outside world (Dittrich/DoS, 1999). DoS attacks
usually take one of two forms - resource starvation or resource overload (RFP, 1999). In
its base form, a denial of service could be considered the same as unplugging the
computer from the wall: DoS keeps the target from being able to continue with legitimate
work. "A denial of service attack is characterized by an explicit attempt by attackers that
restrict legitimate users of a service from using that service" (CERT/DoS, 2000).
Usually executing a DoS attack is simpler than an exploit attack. In essence, all
one needs to do is footprint and scan a target. Once a target is found and determined to
be susceptible to a denial of service, an attack can be made. Denial of Service attacks
take many forms - for example, www, technotronic. com/denial. html lists over 25 different
methods of instigating DoS attacks. The most common form of DoS is packet flooding,
briefly described in Chapter n. If one continually sends SYN packets to a target, using a
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simple packet crafting application, the target's buffer will fill up and block any legitimate
traffic while waiting for more packets.
TCP's 3-way handshake ?*™\y—j\
1) SYN sent from client
Client
2) SYN/ACK sent from server
3) ACK sent from client
Server
Figure 8. TCP/IP Three Way Handshake (From Ref. Northcutt, 1999)
Sending a massive amount of legitimate traffic could flood a target. An attacker can
send packets to a broadcast network and have all the replies sent to the target, thus
multiplying the target's traffic by a factor of 50 to 200. Craig Huegen of Cisco systems
demonstrated this attack, called a smurf attack, using half a Tl connection. Tl
connections usually run at 1.5Mbps and Mr. Huegen used 768Kbps, roughly the
equivalent an attacker would be able to use in a cracked system. By bouncing the
768Kbps worth of packets to two broadcast networks, he was able to produce 67.5 Mbps
of traffic to a third target, multiplying his traffic by a factor of 88 (Huegen, 1998).
1. Example of Denial of Service
One of the more nasty open source tools on the Internet is "TFN2K", a
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attack tool. TFN2K stands for Tribe Flood
Network 2000, the improvement to the original TFN attack tool written by a programmer
called "mixter". TFN2K, as opposed to a simple attack, uses multiple computers to carry
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out a DoS. The attacker sets up on a network of computers that can multiply the amount
of packets that can be generated than by a single computer. Figure 3 shows a distributed
denial of service attack in action.
Figure 9. Distributed Denial of Service Architecture (From Ref. Bernstein, 2000)
TFN2K, at its core, is composed of two parts, the masters and the daemons. The
master sends commands to the daemons that reside on different computers. The
communication is one way from the master to the daemons, which helps with the
anonymity of the master. Previously the attacker had to break into multiple machines and
load the daemons on the target computers, by either Trojan Horse attacks or Exploit
attacks. When sufficient amount of computers have been loaded with the daemons, the
attacker crafts an attack strategy on his master computers.
With TFN2K, the attacker can pick between a myriad of attack techniques and
strategies. The attacker can change the source IP numbers to either hide the master's
identity and/or implicate another site. To the target under attack, it would appear that a
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huge range of random sites were demanding resources, sending malformed packets, and
pinging all at the same time.
Many sources feel that the attacks on Ebay and Yahoo earlier in 2000 were from a
DDoS attack. In one attack on the University of Minnesota, an attacker loaded daemons
into over 2,200 computers and was able to take down the system for three days (Dittrich,
2000).
2. Conclusion to Denial of Service Attacks
Simple denial of service attacks can be made from almost any computer, without
needing much skill. Most of these attacks could be tracked to its source or stopped at the
target's ISP through implemented security measures and patches. The reason why Denial
of Service is not more common is the high degree of chance there is of being caught by
the authorities if the attacker does not cover his tracks well. Few people have the skill to
hide their identity on the Internet effectively (Northcutt, 1999).
Distributed Denial of Service Attacks involves both Trojan Horse Attacks and
Exploit Attacks to set up an attack network. Skill is needed to hide the daemons and
hide the fact that target systems have been infiltrated.
Theoretically, there is no defense to a DoS; an overwhelming amount of legitimate
traffic can induce a denial of service. Several ISPs now block certain features that could
hinder certain DoS attacks, but the dedicated attacker simply would then attack the
target's ISP. Because of the lack of skill it involves, Denial of Service attacks are usually
looked upon in disdain by the hacker community (see www, packetfactoid,com and
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lectures at DEFCON 2000). It is a brute force attack that has very little finesse.
However, it still poses a major threat to sites because of the lack of ability to counter or
block it. (Dittrich/DoS, 1999)
D. SOURCES OF ATTACK AND TOOL SOFTWARE
There is an increase in attacks after an advisory [from CERT] - the
advisory tells the intruder community when a new exploit is out there
(Carpenter, 2000)
Rather than give an exhaustive list of tools that would more than likely be
outdated by the publication of this paper, this section discusses the methods ofhow script
kiddies find modern tools and techniques. Attackers and script kiddies rely upon the
expert programmers and engineers to find the vulnerabilities and then develop tools to
exploit the vulnerabilities. The security industry and security focused websites give
valuable starting points to the script kiddie attacker. A prospective script kiddie attacker
can "ride the wave" of the vulnerability exploit lifecycle outlined in Chapter EL " Script
kiddies are happy with any way in [and] you can almost always get in" (Fithen, 2000).
By attempting a new exploit quickly, an attacker might be able to sneak in before the
sysadmin fixes the weakness. There are several government and industrial sponsored
sites that list all the new notifications on a daily basis. There are also openly hacker-
friendly sites that list all the new tools and exploits on the Internet as well. It's only a
matter of research and motivation: checking sites every day to see what is new on the
Internet.
37
One of the best sources of vulnerabilities and exploits is www.secuhtyfocus.com,
where vulnerabilities are outlined by individual platforms. The site also has a search
engine that an attacker can use once the target has been enumerated. It has daily
updates on the computer security field and links to a wide range of tool providing sites.
It's far from being the sole provider of security related information, but to the author it
appears to be the user-friendliest. Lists of popular starting websites, Usenet newsgroups,
and newsletters that an attacker could use to start information gathering are given in the
"Links" pages of almost any security related website.
An attacker can also attend the growing number of annual hacker conventions
around the country to meet experts and learn how people both attack and defend. Experts
from both sides of the security fence, both "black hats" and "white hats", give
demonstrations and lectures. Included in the DEFCON 2000 convention was a room
specially configured for people to practice hacking in a "competition" environment, with
a high learning curve. Although usually hosted more for its social aspects of the
computer community than anything else, conventions give opportunities for prospective
attackers to learn more about their craft.
Additionally, IRC (Internet Relay Chat) channels can be used by attackers to get
information from people more familiar with the code than themselves. Several of the
authors of tools describe how to use their tools properly, but the vast majority writes their
code as quickly as possible (Maximum Security, 2000). Some coders also make their
programs extremely difficult to understand to keep the tools proliferation low and out of
script kiddie hands (Fithen, 2000). On the other hand, the coder Fyodor has an extensive
help and manual file, with examples of successful methods. Fyodor also has a newsletter
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where he takes suggestions from his subscribers on the features that they want in future
versions of nmap. One source of popular tools for this study was the results of a survey
by Fyodor. Encompassing over 2000 security conscience users, they picked 50 of the
most pertinent open source tools on the Internet, which is incorporated as Appendix A.
Many security sites provide the explanations and reasons why exploits work and
how to determine if an attack has been made. Prospective attackers can view these reports
and change their methods to remain stealthy. According to Maximum Security's
anonymous author, a key for an attacker is to search the Usenet newsgroups for
conversational threads on a particular exploit/weakness. At certain Usenet postings
legitimate security personnel, open to be viewed by anyone subscribing to the newsgroup,
will discuss problems or new details about vulnerabilities. One site named BUQTRAQ
tracks a wide range of exploits. It is the communal meeting place to discover new
software and tools. "BUQTRAQ is probably the Internet's most valuable resource for
online reporting of UNIX-based vulnerabilities" (Maximum Security, 2000). One of the
more interesting features is a listing of sites that are vulnerable to being used to help with
DoS attacks (Sans, 2000). Originally designed to embarrass the sites into corrective
action, this type of publicity gives attackers a ready list of resources.
Attackers have a wide range of resources to choose from to discover tools and
vulnerabilities. In many cases the same warnings sent to sysadmins are notices of
opportunity to potential attackers. Attackers get their information in the same way they
let others write the code for tools: by using the labors of others. With a bit of research
and time, a hacker can discover a significant amount of information on a new
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vulnerability without having to invest the time to discover the knowledge himself or
herself.
E. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there is no one single "magic" tool that an attacker can use to break
into any target. Specific tools take specific actions. However, by having knowledge of
how to use tools, an attacker can follow a step-by-step process of gaining information to
complete a successful attack. Owning the tools does not necessarily mean the attacker
has the skill to know how to employ them. Dr. Longstaff of CMU CERT, recounts an
attack he witnessed: "a script kiddie used an advanced break-in tool, but didn't know
what to do once he was in - he was using DOS commands on a UNTX box" (2000),
obviously the attacker was using the tool blindly. A large amount of knowledge is
encoded into tools, but as of yet no tool does everything for the script kiddie.
The newest successful tools and techniques are constantly being updated on a
large amount of websites. Potential attackers review the latest techniques from Internet
experts, on both sides of the security fence, to find the best methods of attack. Online
attack search engines for enumerated systems give attackers easy resources to specific
tools that they wish to attack. Warnings and explanations from government organizations
and software corporations give attackers information on ways to avoid detection and
indirectly how to conduct successful attacks. The successful attacker using open source
tools carefully chooses tools and methods by polling multiple sources, piggy backing on
other peoples' experiences and expertise.
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IV. FIVE APPLICATIONS OF CURRENT OPEN SOURCE TOOLS
This chapter presents five brief case studies that utilize open source tools found
on the Internet today. Two are historical cases of recent attacks. The other three cases are
notional possibilities that could occur using current open source tools. The goal of the
chapter is to investigate why the cases were/could be successful and to examine the
important aspects and considerations of each scenario.
The chapter is presented in two parts. Part one is a discussion on the two
historical open source cases. Part two examines three theoretical applications of open
source tools and some of their specific considerations. The chapter concludes with a
small part on some of the considerations in using DDoS attacks.
A. HISTORICAL CASE STUDY ONE - 1Love You Worm
The I Love You Worm (ILYW) was not an open source tool: it was a worm. At its
core it was a Visual Basic Program that self-propagated through Microsoft Outlook. The
ILYW is included in this chapter because it took advantage of an inherent weakness that
is open source: a Microsoft feature that allowed the execution of code without safety
precautions. Because it is written in Visual Basic Script (VBS), it only worked on
Microsoft Windows applications such as Microsoft Outlook.
The worm traveled mainly by electronic mail. When the script was run, the worm
would send copies of itself to every address in the Outlook file and alter several files on
the affected system. The worm was successful because the standard features of Microsoft
products were not safety conscious. Out of the box, Microsoft Outlook will run VBS
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code that an email might have with it, even by just previewing the email. When a person
viewed his email, the malicious code would infiltrate his system.
The ILYW was released around the first of May, 2000 and quickly spread around
the world. According to CERT, at its height it affected about 500,000 individual systems
and adversely affected many networks due to the high generated level of mail and file
traffic (CERT Advisory, 2000). Interestingly, the ILYW also made its way onto four
classified computer systems within the DOD infrastructure, most likely through the
introduction of disks through personnel security lapses, rather than by any Internet
connection (Plummer, 2000).
1. Important Aspects of the I Love You Worm
The ELYW demonstrates how a widespread application with an exploited
weakness can have far reaching effects. If the author of the ELYW had exploited a
weakness in the old Borland Quattro Pro application, the effects would have been
obviously less intense. An application spread widely on the Internet with an exploited
weakness, has more far-reaching consequences than a heterogeneous mixture of
applications would. As shown in Figure 1, NT and Linux servers are the most popular
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Figure 10. OS Server Distribution (From Ref. Attrition, 2000)
Since these OS's have the farthest reaches, they get the most attention in people's
searches for weaknesses. It is a Catch-22: the most popular OS's with the farthest
reaches will have the most vulnerabilities because they are the most popular. Those
discovered vulnerabilities would have more impact because of the popularity of
successful OS's. Figure 2 shows the number of vulnerabilities found per OS broken
down in the last four years. As the chart shows, there is a sharp increase in










Figure 11. OS Vulnerabilities by Type (From Ref. Securityfocus, 2000)
Finally, many copycat worms were released in quick succession after the
popularity ofILYW hit the mainstream press. All versions attempted to exploit the same
weakness that the original ILYW did, sometimes improving on the "rookie application"
code that was easily available. (Powell, 2000; Finley, 2000). They followed the
"Vulnerability Life Cycle" examined in Chapter n, and had a much smaller effect than
the original ILYW.
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B. HISTORICAL CASE STUDY TWO - Distributed Denial ofService
The attacks on Yahoo and other sites were pinpricks on the body of
e-commerce and pretty insignificant overall. James Adams, CEO of
Infrastructure Defense (Sheppard, 2000).
Over the course of several days in February 2000, a series of DDoS attacks hit
several of the most popular sites on the Internet. Although effective only for a few hours
at a time, the attacks instigated a widespread fear in many of not being able to protect
themselves. These attacks were very notorious and produced a flurry of responses from
all levels of society, from the press to the White House, as many felt that the base
security of the Internet was at risk. The attacks were popular even to the point of
momentarily affecting the performance of the stock exchanges: contributing to a 258-
point slide in the DOW Jones average and a similar hit in the NASDAQ market
(Pearlman, 2000).
The largest attack was on February 7th
,
when a DDoS matrix attacked Yahoo, a
popular web portal. According to Global Center, Yahoo's ISP, they can handle up to 4.5
gigabits per second on their total network. On the day of the attack they received over 1
gigabits per second, effectively swamping the bandwidth that was set aside for Yahoo
(Grice, 2000). Yahoo was forced to move to its back-up ISP to continue functioning,
being forced offline for three hours.
The attacks continued throughout the week. On the 8th of February 2000,
Buy.com, Ebay, CNN, and Amazon were hit, followed by ETrade and ZDNet on
Wednesday. Overall, nine total sites were hit with all very similar DDoS attacks. The
results varied from site to site: Yahoo had the highest bandwidth attack with 1 GPS while
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Buy.com was hit the hardest with over 800 MPS, which was eight times its normal
traffic.
When the FBI started investigating, they discovered that the same fifty IP
addresses were involved in almost all of the attacks. However, according to Weld Pond
of @Stake, "more likely hundreds of thousands of servers were used and the data forged
to make it look like it came from only 50 addresses", in a form of IP spoofing, and part of
a complex coordinated attack (Lemos, 2000). About two weeks after the other attacks,
the investigators themselves were the victims of a denial of service; on Feb 18
www.fbi.gov was taken down for three hours in a DDoS attack. This underscored that
"pretty much anyone is a target". (Dube, February 25, 2000). Included in the attack on
the FBI was an attack on Microsoft. However, the DDoS didn't have enough bandwidth
to be able to affect the Microsoft site.
The FBI believes that the DDoS attack tool, TFN2K or stracheldraht (German for
"barbed wire"), was the software used for the attack. Several thousand computers were
used in the attack, which points to a significant amount of time invested to break in and
install the TFN2K code. The FBI felt that a Canadian teenager named "Mafiaboy" was
the main culprit behind the denial of service attacks. Due to some IRC chat logs, the FBI
was able to link him to having knowledge of unique aspects of the attacks and based on
this and other evidence Mafiaboy was arrested and questioned last April. There has been
much speculation as to whether Mafiaboy is the actual culprit, but just the fact that they
seriously consider a 15-year-old boy a credible potential threat is interesting and
troubling.
46
1. Important Aspects of the DDoS Attacks
The DDoS attacks were not a total surprise. CERT, along with other security
related sites, had put out warnings and advisories the year before about the possibility of
just such an attack. It wasn't a matter of "if, but of "when". Actually, the FBI had
discovered in June, after the attacks, that many computers had been infiltrated with the
daemon program for another DDoS attack (Thomas, 2000). It's possible that some
computers that were in that report were used in the original February attack.
Mafiaboy, or whoever the attacker was, specifically targeted some university
computers as part of his bandwidth source. University computers make great targets
because of the high bandwidth universities usually lease, in addition to the centralized
security policies. If one computer in a bank of computers at a university has a weakness,
chances are that all the computers in the same room have the identical weakness.
In addition, according to Gary McGraw of Reliable Software technologies,
"[Universities] don't always have the resources to guarantee good security. In fact, many
are committed to openness, and that makes it very easy for someone to commandeer
them" (CNET, 2000). Universities also have to balance the interests of their research
with the need for security, and some security measures would hamper certain types of
research. The specific targeting of education computers might give pause to the trend of
putting a computer for each child in the public education. Right now, 95 percent of all
schools have at least one computer, and these and future computers could be easy targets
for attackers to get bandwidth (Krebs, 2000).
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Finally, and most important, several companies that spent millions of dollars on
security were vulnerable to open source tools that were freely available on the Internet.
Although able to screen out massive amounts of packets, even the most expensive
firewalls still need to spend a non-zero amount of time to examine the packets. If enough
packets are sent, even ones obviously malformed or from a known hostile IP address, the
firewalls can still be forced to slow down legitimate traffic. The companies were
successfully attacked because the security weakness of others on the Internet were used
against them.
C. THEORETICAL CASE STUDY ONE - TERRORISM ON THE CHEAP
One possible case that could occur involves a DDoS attack along the same lines
as the Ebay and Yahoo attacks. But rather than one lone civilian, this case study involves
a motivated, trained person who is sponsored by a terrorist organization/state. For this
example, the terrorist state of choice is Iran because of its past history of terrorist support
around the world, but almost any country could set up this operation (Arquilla/Shimeall,
2000). Iran, in this scenario has reason to visit harm upon the United States in the form
of an Internet terrorist activity.
The scenario starts out with the goals of Iran: punishment of the United States for
its activist foreign policy. The punishment, in this case, is the disruption of the American
lifestyle by instilling uneasiness in the populace of the U.S. Iran wishes to break down
the illusion that the US is safe from all enemies. Iran decides to send a homegrown
computer specialist/agent into the United States to develop a computer attack capability.
Iran makes a fake passport and identity for the man we will call "Bob".
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Iran gives Bob $100,000 seed money for sustenance and to formulate his attack.
He acquires twenty bank checking accounts throughout the geographic region he is
located. An account charge card is issued for each account. Bob then puts $5,000 in each
account. Using the charge card, Bob goes to all the local ISPs and secures several high-
speed accounts, automatically drawing the payments from his charge card.
Bob could form a DDoS matrix using the open source tool TFN2K. Now, having
several high-speed accounts throughout the region, a "master" computer will control each
account. From there, he will start attacking computers from each master, using his skills
to install the daemon software. He will spend the next few months amassing a bank of
daemons for each master, laying low until he has a few thousand computers in his matrix.
Once the matrix is set up, Bob will have a wide range of computers to fulfill his
needs. He can decide how much bandwidth and effect he wants by choosing the number
of masters to use. This works well, because, while the authorities will eventually
discover some masters and their daemons, Bob will still have his other masters to
continue with the attacks. DDoS tools are a "wasting asset": every use after the first
degrades the effectiveness of its next use (Arquilla, 2000). More and more of the matrix
will be lost as computers are discovered as being helpers in the attacks. However, a one-
time terrorist might not care that he will possibly lose some of his daemon computers as
long as the intended attack succeeds once.
Bob has a whole range of activities that he can perform in order to disrupt society
and gain a significant amount of press. Bob could have his daemon computers use an
open source tool called 911 Worm. 911 Worm is an open source tool that polls the
computers' ports for telephone lines and initiates a call to 91 1 in the area. The tool then
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formats the hard drive, in hopes of erasing any sign of the intruding software. (CERT,
2000) Bob could use many computers in the same area to swamp the 911 circuits as a
stand-alone activity or use it in conjunction with a conventional terrorist activity to
increase the confusion and reaction time. The flooding would greatly hamper the
response time causing more damage and press for the terrorists.
Additionally, the matrix could be used for denial of service attacks involving
blackmail. In the DDoS attacks earlier in 2000, ETrade was one of the sites hit,
effectively putting it out of commission for a few hours. Earlier in 1999, in an unrelated
incident, ETrade was out for 22 hours which cost them five million dollars in revenue and
26 percent of their stock value, as well as damaging their reputation (Dube, 2000). The
terrorists might be able to demonstrate a denial of service and then use this proof to
blackmail ETrade or other financial sites into publishing their manifesto on their web
sites. Even the public announcement of the intention of conducting a DDOS would affect
the reputation and stock price of ETrade (McHugh, 2000).
Bob's range of activities is only limited by one's imagination. This is a very
attractive scenario for Iran because of the high chance of success and the low chance of
being caught before an attack is made. In addition, Iran would keep the attention of the
American public as the attacks continue, despite the efforts of the FBI. Another
important aspect is that Iran can deny culpability. Using the open source tools gives
deniability, because of TFN2K's well-known signature, and since it is so widely
available, anyone might be the culprit.
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D. THEORETICAL CASE STUDY TWO - CHINA WITH AN ACE UP HER
SLEEVE
China has remarked that if forced to fight, they will fight asymmetrically. During
times of peace, China is interested in gaining access to the World Trade Organization and
bettering U.S. economic ties. However, a patient and smart country such as China could
be forming a hidden DDoS matrix for use in case hostilities between our two countries
occur. There would be a great advantage to having such a structure in place once
hostilities did erupt, in terms of time, speed, and security. Dan Kuehl, professor of the
National Defense University, says Russia and China have the capability to attack the US
power grid successfully and, in addition, "have clearly enunciated computer attack
strategies aimed at sowing fear and crippling an adversary's military and commercial
information infrastructure" (Loeb, 2000). China would keep this "ace up the sleeve"
until its use was deemed necessary.
China surely has the required expertise to discover the significant nodes that
would be damaging or sow significant confusion in the event of the matrix ever needing
to be used. According to the Washington Post , over 95 percent of US military
communications goes over civilian lines; these nodes might be especially enticing (Gray,
1997). One possible target could be the Satellite Communication (SATCOM) lines or
their ground station transfers. China could lease a SATCOM line beforehand and study
any weaknesses where an open source tool could have impact.
China could have computer attackers go out and make a bank of daemon
computers throughout the world. The attackers could then pool all the IP addresses of the
daemon computers into a central database to be controlled by a few master computers in
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China or other safe places in the U.S. They could even form their own Dial-Up Bulletin
Board Systems (BBS), which would not be connected to the Internet, to help their
collection efforts. Their "agents", or undercover computer science students at US UC
systems, could dial up and get the approved open source tools to infiltrate other systems.
Open source tools are important for this scenario for several reasons. First, the
tools are widespread and have known signatures. Some infiltrated computers are bound
to be discovered by their rightful owners and having a widespread open source tool gives
a form of anonymity to the Chinese. In addition, the attack might be able to be pulled off
without the target discovering that China was behind it. All the target would know is that
it is getting hit by a notorious DDoS, and not necessarily the motivation or identity of the
people behind the attack.
The DDoS attack could be combined with a military attack to compound the
confusion and damage. The scenario would put China in a strategic dilemma however;
China would no longer be anonymous and thus, would be attributable to the electronic
attack. The military attack would have to be after the electronic attack for the maximum
damage, thus a DDoS/military combination would forfeit some secrecy that a military
attack is possibly underway. Finally, DDoS are not clear-cut weapons; there is always
some spill over collateral damage to other countries (Longstaff, 2000). There are
unintended consequences: China might hit people she didn't anticipate or possibly affect
the Internet in ways more damaging to China than the United States.
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E. THEORETICAL CASE STUDY THREE - GNUTELLA/NAPSTER
TROJAN HORSES
The last case study involves taking advantage of the exploding popularity of Peer-
to-Peer (P2P) connections. One of the consequences of the digital age is the ability to
make perfect, compressed, digitally identical files, such as MP3 music files. Rather than
purchasing a CD, one can find P2P software that allows you to find a digital copy on the
Internet. Digital music files, and the ease with which to download them, have produced a
fertile market for the development of software to share those files. Since the RIAA vs.
Napster legal case started in 2000, the popularity of P2P connections has skyrocketed; it
now has a 445 percent growth rate with over 20 million customers. (Barlow, October
2000, and Kelsey, September 2000).
P2P, in simple terms, forms a trusted relationship between two computers. A
service like Napster, or software like Gnutella, gives users an opportunity to find and
download files from other users' computers around the world, forming a logical link akin
to a web page connection (Kuptz, 2000). In this regard, a user can bypass copyright
payments and laws, and download files directly from another person's computer.
The weakness lies in the widespread use of P2P software and the possibility of
downloading a Trojan Horse file that looks like a media file. There is an open source tool
called "wrapster" that makes any file look like an MP3 file (The site is
www.members.fortunecity.com/wrapster). An attacker could use wrapster in conjunction
with Netbus or Sub7 RAT server files, joined by "jointer" as mentioned in Chapter Three,
with an authentic music file to make a Trojan Horse music file. If the attacker then did
this to a huge range of songs and allowed the P2P community access, his Trojan Horse
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MP3 files would be spread to each computer that downloaded from him. When the song
is played - the RAT server would be installed as well, forming a quick resource of
accessible computers that could be found later.
F. DDoS CONSIDERATIONS
There is essentially nothing a site can do with currently available
technology to prevent becoming a victim of ... a coordinated network
flood. The impact upon your site and operations is dictated by the
(in)security of other sites and the ability of a remote attacker to implant
the tools and subsequently to control and direct multiple systems
worldwide to launch an attack (Distributed-Systems Intruder Tools
Workshop, CERT Coordination Center, Nov. 1999).
Right now, an unknown number of attackers, sponsored or un-sponsored, could be
amassing a huge "army" of computers. Similar to the buried clay armies of Xian, China,
once enough bandwidth is found, their masters could have them rise out of the
underground and attempt to wreck havoc. It is no coincidence that three of the case
studies were DDoS attacks; having such a powerful tool with a lack of security against it
makes it very enticing to use for the case studies. It is an attack known to have few
defenses other than the effort needed to form it and the need for an individual to remain
anonymous.
The best defense from a DDoS has been through the deterrence by punishment.
Most solutions to the DDoS threat are involved with the aftermath and the prosecution of
those responsible. In the case of the DDoS attacks earlier this year, the FBI has said,
besides civil cases from the companies, the criminals, "face a five-year prison term for a
first offense, 10 years if convicted of multiple and up to $250,000 per count" (Messner,
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2000). The fear of a thorough search and administration of justice keep many potential
offenders from initiating computer attacks (www.cybercrime.gov).
There are few solutions to a DDoS, such as filtering outflow IP addresses so they
can't be spoofed, but then that only means those computers that started the DDOS will be
located, the attack will still be performed (McHugh, 2000). For one-time attacks, like the
China case, finding the daemon computers after the fact wouldn't matter. But for
individual attackers or terrorist who wishes to use the matrix over and over again, the IP
filtering would increase the "wasting asset" impact, as computers that took part in the
attack would be located. Right now, there are few ISP's that egress filter IP addresses;
thus, the security of one's site is partially impacted by the security of all other sites.
G. CONCLUSION
The five case studies described provide a small indication of what is possible with
open source tools today. The theoretical cases could be over-shadowed by current
events: "So far no one has died from a computer attack yet", but some possibilities
definitely exist (Fithen, 2000). Country vs. country computer attacks have been
envisioned, and practiced on the small scale in a few cases, but the appropriate responses
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Figure 12. Vulnerability Trend (From Ref. Securityfocus, 2000)
Security is generally reacting to the threats and thus is always a step behind;
therefore deterrence has remained the main solution to stop attacks. Figure 3 shows the
recent trend for the discovery of vulnerabilities per month. Granted, not every one of
these weaknesses is developed into an open source tool, however the knowledge of such
weaknesses is a form of open source tool in itself. An attacker can still pick and choose
of among the over than 50 new vulnerabilities each month, or nearly two a day, to find
and attempt an exploit. It is important to note that the majority of these discovered
vulnerabilities are immediately fixed by the vendors in the form of open source patches.
In conclusion, modern-day open source tools can have significant future impact
and consequences due to the wide spread availability and the lack of real defenses (at
least in the case of a DDoS attack). However, the five scenarios described might be
considered extremes of what is possible; similar attacks are probably not more common
due to the high probability of being discovered after the attempts, and the uncertain
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nature of what nations might consider to be appropriate responses to a nation-to-nation
Internet attack. Non-state attackers fall under the same considerations, as the unknown
blowback might be more than they are willing to risk.
57
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
58
V. FUTURE TRENDS
You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for
the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your
movements are more rapid than those of the enemy SunTzu, The Art of
War.
A. INTRODUCTION
This final chapter consists of two parts: future trends of open source tools, and a
summary of findings. The future trends section is derived from my observations and
interviews over the last year of research. In it I have chosen seven trends that may bear
upon developments in future open source tools. The summary of findings concludes this
study with my "State of the Union" regarding the status of open source tools on the
Internet today.
The trend of open source tools is captured in Figure 1 . The chart, obtained from
CERT, shows that, over time, a decreasingly sophisticated attacker can initiate
increasingly sophisticated attacks. It appears that this trend will continue to progress in
this fashion in the future as well. Additionally, the knowledge required to perform the
whole range of attacks will decrease; in other words, as newer open source tools are
developed, all attacks across the line will be easier to conduct than in the past, which
would be represented in the chart as an overall lowering of the attacker's knowledge
arrow.
However, as discussed in Chapter HI, access to the tools does not guarantee their
correct usage. The tools might provide entryways into a system, but in most cases, once
in the system, do not provide the expertise to exploit the system. Expertise is still
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needed to take full advantage of tools (Longstaff, 2000). Never the less, as described in
Cvberterror, Prospects and Implications , "An unskilled attacker could [still] stumble
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Figure 13. Attack Sophistication VS. Intruder Knowledge (From Ref. CERT, 2000)
B. TRENDS DISCOVERED DURING RESEARCH
Trend 1: Enhanced Multi-Tools
The first trend is the continued progression of the chart in Figure 1 . In addition to
more sophisticated operations being programmed, I think the next step is the combination
of several different operations integrated into single tools, called multi-tools. This will
have the effect of lowering the "barricades to entry" to attackers. While there are some
60
examples of this today (mainly in detection of vulnerabilities), the new tools will take the
attacker through several steps of the attack sequence, ending with an option to conduct
several forms of attack. The overall ease of use of tools will be enhanced, meaning less
computer expertise needed, as almost all the operations will be done, "behind the scenes".
Tools are also being developed with extensive help files, sometimes incorporated into the
program themselves, providing instruction on how to properly use the tool under different
conditions.
The multi-tools will have more automation in the set-up for an attack and the
attack itself. More programmer knowledge will be coded into scanning, enumerating and
providing direction on the likely avenues to pursue a successful attack. They will be
similar to the multi-vulnerability detection software on the market and Internet today:
able to determine if systems are vulnerable by testing a wide range of known
vulnerability operations. The Security Administrator's Tool for Analyzing Networks
(SATAN), an older, popular vulnerability testing program mainly used on UNIX based
computers, started out and continues to be used in legitimate ways; however, it is also
used to test other peoples' systems for multiple vulnerabilities. Attackers will continue
to use legitimate tools in illegal ways.
Another aspect of the trend is consolidation of the response databases. More
scanning responses will be incorporated into multi-tools. There might be a combination
of a wide range of OS, firewall, router and platform responses, like the nmap database,
joined with a range of exploits that those targets might have. Additionally, there are
scripts called "rootkits" that help get root level access and hide the fact that attackers
were ever there. Rootkits are specific to the target OS and software. They are powerful
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tools that exceed the skill level of the average sysadmin (Dittrich, 2000). I think
programmers are going to combine a range of rootkits into one larger rootkit database
which will be utilized to attack a variety of computer systems. A wider reaching rootkit
database would be more effective and efficient, since it would target more systems and
consolidate the past work of other programmers.
Overall, future multi-tools will take the current situation a step further by
becoming "one-stop shopping" tools for a select set of systems. Multi-tools will
determine the vulnerabilities, then give options of a variety of attacks that could be used
against the target, all in a GUI environment. An attacker would only have to set the range
of IP addresses to search, and the tool would basically do the rest, prompting you with
options to continue or stop.
Finally, programmers might code a "framework" program that attackers would be
able to fill with open source modules that perform specific parts of an attack. For
example, one would be able to load different methods from different programmers and be
able to execute them from a single tool. The framework would be the epitome of an open
source tool and benefit from the coding of programmers around the globe. Much like the
ability to add filters to Adobe Photoshop and the downloadable signatures from McAfree
and Norton, an attacker would be able to continually upgrade as new methods are coded
into modules that would add features and techniques into this new "open source" coded
multi-attack tool.
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Trend 2: Explosion of Internet Capable Devices
The Internet is undergoing explosive growth. As of 1 July 2000, there were two
billion unique pages on the Internet, "and that number is growing to the tune of 7 million
pages a day" (McGuire, 2000). By 2001, according to Cyveillance.com, the Internet will
have doubled in size to 4 billion unique pages. The increasing popularity of the Internet
provides a huge market incentive to develop Internet devices capable of tapping into this
vast amount of data and the inter-communication possibilities.
A new developing trend is the ability to attach the Internet to everything possible,
from refrigerators to hand-held PDAs. A project called Bluetooth, backed by over 2000
of the largest Internet companies, is the most likely future standard for wireless
communication between the Internet devices. The project site (www.bluetooth.com)
envisions auto-synchronization and seamless transfer of bits between any number of
Bluetooth capable applications. The trend would be helped by the "Internet on a chip" -
a quick option to connect the device to the Internet with its own IP address.
Your home, workplace, and car will all be logically connected and able to talk to
each other. In addition, similar devices will automatically connect for immediate
communication: the instant your milk goes bad, voice messages can be sent to wherever
you are, giving you the option of ordering some more, or having your refrigerator do it.
One would have a "personal network" to help with a variety of needs and wishes.
(Hibbard, 2000).
Unfortunately, open source tools would take advantage of the trusting
relationship between the multiple devices. Safeguarding all of the devices would be
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difficult, especially for private citizens. End users with only one processor and
connection have a hard time now; but with five or more connections, more chances of
being vulnerable to an attack increase dramatically. New attack tools could query more
of a target's computers. Once attacked or infected, attackers could hijack your
bandwidth or be able to track your transactions, habits, and financial status.
Finally, one consequence of the proliferation of Internet capable devices is the
shrinking availability of IP addresses. Each new device would require its own IP address.
Right now the Internet is working with IPv4, with a theoretical limit of 4,294,967,296
unique IP addresses, based upon a 64-bit address system. To continue the expansion of
the Internet, more IP addresses have to be made available. IPv6 is the newest proposal to
expand the number of addresses and it is based upon a 128-bit address system, 4 billion
times bigger than the current IPv4 system.
Incorporating IPv6 creates new concerns for open source tools and their
developers. Along with expanding the number of addresses, IPv6 was developed to
upgrade the old packet architecture and incorporate some helpful security measures. One
of the key features of IPv6 is its reverse IP address checking capability. This means IP
addresses will no longer be able to be spoofed as easily, which would have a deterrent
effect on some possible attackers. In addition, IPv6 employs some encryption bits in the
header to allow verification that the packet has not been altered. (Bay network and Nokia
research center, 1999). This is also currently being achieved with systems using IPsec as
well.
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Trend 3: Wireless Networks - The Absence of an "Air Gap"
Another trend of the future that uses the explosion of Internet devices is the
wireless "revolution", taking place in the workplace, home, and on the body. Similar to
third world countries installing cell phone networks, wireless connectivity allows the user
to leapfrog the hardwire infrastructure requirement that would usually go along with the
bandwidth. However, wireless communication erases the security-enhancing "air gap"
on systems. Although wireless systems could be highly mobile, not needing a physical
connection is a benefit that could be turned into a liability or vulnerability. Instead of
being able to physically remove any possible connection to the internet, hardware will
have wireless receivers that can be taken advantage of. These machines will be "always
connected" unless specifically taken out of the receiving mode. Open source tools could
be developed to exploit these capabilities, possibly by a blind transmission of malicious
software to wireless machines.
Additionally, wireless systems like Bluetooth or other systems utilizing a
Wireless Local Loop (WLL) could be vulnerable to many more forms of attack besides
software manipulation, such as electronic warfare jamming, burnout, and hijacking. As
the saying goes, "a chain is only as strong as the weakest link". Adding extra links to a
WLL might create extra vulnerabilities that give newly developed open source tools the
ability to exploit.
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Trend 4: High Bandwidth Proliferation
The increasingly pervasive, high-speed, always on connection of
DSL and cable have provided the foundation to build [the new Internet]
upon. As a result, the Yankee Group predicts that home networks will
mushroom from some 650,000 in existence today to more than 10 million
by 2003 (Clyman, 2000).
There are over 144 million Americans surfing the net at home, which is 52
percent of the population (Kelsey, 2000). The US Internet population has a 35 percent
growth rate and there will be 10 million people employed in the Internet economy by
2002, 5.8 million of them in the U.S. (Krebs, 2000). Needless to say, there is a huge
market incentive for high speed Internet access.
Demand for high-speed access is propelling DSL and cable services as the
successors of dial-up modem service. Consumers demand faster and faster connections
and DSL/cable hook-ups are the new broadband suppliers. Traditionally hampered by
hardware requirements, new research has allowed software to handle some of the old
hardware concerns, opening DSL to huge potential markets (Gartner, 2000).
DSL and cable connections make a target more vulnerable to attack: they are
connected to the Internet on a persistent basis and are not phone-line based. Thus, DSLs
usually have a constant IP address as long as the computers are powered. An attacker can
target a persistent IP address easier than a modem dial-up, since it is harder to anticipate
when a dial-up will be connected. A persistent IP address permits an attacker time to test
the whole range of tools, exploits, and techniques until one works (Konda, 2000).
Additionally, since these are home networks, they are usually more vulnerable than a
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Additionally, since these are home networks, they are usually more vulnerable than a
high bandwidth connection at a business or organization that might have a security
manager.
According to Frank Prince of Forrester Research,
[An attacker] would have to take over 10,000 of [DSL] computers
instead of 500 large servers so it means more work for them, but I don't
doubt that we'll see it. Sooner or later, there is no question that someone
will have marshalled a large number of private computers to be used in a
high-profile attack (Manjoo, 2000).
As new open source tools become available for this new popular service, the
security of home networks might not keep up and actually be more vulnerable than a dial-
up service. Another consideration is that open source tools might be utilized for a longer
time because it would still be worth the effort for an attacker to get the higher speed
access even if he gets fewer high value targets.
Trend 5: Common Enumeration of Vulnerabilities
The last trend is the formation of a common database of vulnerabilities by several
different organizations. It is thought that the function of such a database would have
many beneficial attributes to combat the effects of vulnerabilities and tools that exploit
weaknesses. The common database would help in the exchange, interpretation, and
correlation of information that would shorten the effectiveness or even neutralize
emerging vulnerabilities (Baker, 1999).
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However, the formation of a common database has three main obstacles
(Meunier, 1999). The first obstacle is the technical aspect of sharing data. The proper
nomenclature, the format of the data, the correctness of the data, and even the language
used to share the database are difficult to agree upon. Additionally the trustworthiness of
the data from outside sources might deter one organization from using data that was
compiled by a suspect source.
Secondly, there is a motivational obstacle to overcome. Compiling the data is
expensive and time consuming, and dividing the process equally is difficult when it
would be to one organization's benefit to be a "free rider". Conversely, it would also
benefit an organization to withhold information from their competitors. Lastly, the
consequence of sharing a database might provide information that could be used in an
attack against a target, prompting the possibility of a lawsuit. Actually, the Department
of Defense (DOD) will have a common database of vulnerabilities and tools by early
2001 (Seffers, 2000). However, the government has a policy of not sharing its database it
has due to the legal restraints of it having been formed through taxpayer's money.
Overall, a database of vulnerabilities could have a dampening effect on the
longevity of open source tools. If the database was updated frequently and distributed
without charge, a new vulnerability could get widespread attention before a tool could be
produced to take advantage of it. Additionally, there would also be a decrease in the
amount of redundant effort in the security community, allowing more cooperation in the
security community.
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Trend 6: Elevated Status of Programmers
Hackers, crackers, and attackers within the digital community get a fair amount of
press and notoriety. There is substantial fame associated with some of the more popular
hackers: almost every one in the computer industry has at least heard of Mitnick, Poulsen,
Mafiaboy, Morris, Mixter, Rain Forest Puppy, and Fyodor. At DEFCON 2000, a few
hackers were introduced as heroes, and certainly a subculture of fame has developed
around them. For whatever reason these hackers and crackers had initially started to
form code, the hacking community has swept them up and given them encouragement to
continue in their development. Much like the story of the man who got a job at a bank
after robbing them, by showing how he did it, hackers such as Mitnick and Poulsen have
used their fame to gain employment. New hackers have a motivation to make a name for
themselves: respect, notoriety, self-esteem, and employment.
Additionally, hackers such as Fyodor want to please their fans. Fyodor, author of
nmap, has sent out surveys to members of his hacking subscriber circle asking for
features they wish to see in future versions of nmap. What's more, Blade, author of
jointer and tHing, has also shown reaction to his followers in his web site. The new
popularity is motivating the programmers to keep their followers by improving their
products, and actively seeking out their input. Fear outside the community provides press
and fame, while admiration from their fans provides respect, a well-visited web site, and
suggestions for new features.
Overall, the attacker community is becoming better organized. Several sites, such
as www.rootkit.com , openly encourage programmers to join their team and upload their
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software. With a small pool of expert hacking elite, there is an atmosphere of a "Joint-
Combined" team effort to hack some security vulnerabilities discovered. The weeding
out process ensures that successful tools are widely distributed while faulty tools die on
the vine. Finally, there seems to be an increasing interaction on all levels of
communication between attackers, from popular conventions such as Black Hat and
DEFCON, to online web sites and newsgroup subscriptions, fueling more opportunities
for the development of higher quality tools.
Trend Seven: DDoS
But if someone maliciously takes down the biggest nodes, you can
harm the system in incredible ways...The bad news is that Internet
terrorists could cause great damage by targeting the most connected router
(Reuters, 2000).
One of the leading experts on Distribute Denial of Service attacks is Dr. David
Dittrich. He is a professor at Washington University and has produced studies of each of
the major DDoS tools on the Internet. In an interview in the online magazine SlashDot,
Mr. Dittrich outlines a few of the functions he feels that future DDoS tools will
incorporate. For example, one of the functions he feels that could enhance the tfh2k tool
is encryption of the communication between the masters and the daemons. He also
thinks "it won't be long before someone *tries* to take that next step and further
automate the process of scanning & intrusion to constitute DDoS networks." (Roblimo,
2000).
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DDoS could be enhanced by the use of new multi-tools to self propagate. They
could automatically scan a random range of IP addresses until the responses indicate a
system on the other end that contains vulnerabilities that the multi-tool is able to exploit.
A master computer in the matrix might only be able to "infect" one type of system, while
other masters are specialized in other systems, or the whole DDoS matrix could
specifically target only one type of system. Once set into motion, a massive amount of
computers could be theoretically harnessed with very little effort. An automatic self-
propagating matrix has a whole range of inherent problems dealing with growth restraint,
communication, and coordination for an attack making it unreasonable for the time being
(Shimeall, 2000). However, if a tool restricted itself to a short growth cycle, possibly
with a time-initiated attack schedule not requiring communication with a master, those
problems could be overcome.
C. FUTURE APPLICATIONS OF DISTRIBUTED OPEN SOURCE
TOOLS/RATs
Information systems are so vital to the [US] military and civilian
society that they can be the main targets in war, and they can also serve as
the main means for conducting offensive operations (Arquilla, 1999).
DDoS is a waste of bandwidth and processor ability; it is a simple attack that is
very "loud" and gets a lot of attention, making it a wasting asset. In a DDoS, the
bandwidth and processors are used to form packets as quickly as possible. Instead of a
simple attack, new distributed tools will utilize the matrix computers in different ways.
The two major resources in a distributed matrix that can be utilized are bandwidth and
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processor cycles. Additionally, the logical positions of the nodes in the matrix could also
be used to advantage.
One alternate use of a distributed net is being performed by the SETI project.
SETI, the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence, has a voluntary distributed network that
utilizes idle processor time to decipher signal patterns from outer space. They have
formed the most powerful computer in history using an average online number of
500,000 computers in their matrix, calculating close to eight teraflops per day (Patrizo,
2000). Similar distributed networks such as COSM and the Globus Project also harness
large numbers of computers for idle processor time.
A tool that allows the user to decide what is to be computed would permit an
attacker to utilize such networks in several ways. Of course, determining the opportune
time to engage the processor of an unknowing target, and still remain hidden, would be
difficult. A distributed network has been used to break the DES algorithm used to
encrypt files, involving over 100,000 computers taking 22 hours
(http://www.efT.org/descracker). An attacker could gather intelligence from a target,
using an open source sniffer, and utilize a matrix to help crunch user passwords or even
decrypt messages. Granted, a large amount of time would be needed for decryption, but
the encryption would still be eventually broken, much faster than by a single computer.
Sensitive information, that is not time dependent, would eventually be discovered.
An attacker might also be able to use a matrix to gather intelligence or damage the
reputation of a target. If a target system is unable to be attacked, possibly the computers
and routers "around" it could be. An attacker might be able to infect computers and
routers that are between the target and another computer. A percentage of packets that
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originate from the target might be able to be copied from surrounding infected systems to
another site for analysis. According to Nielsen-Net ratings, the average unique sites
visited per month are ten; the key is to find a machine that is in between the target and its
destination. With a large enough matrix, an attacker could determine information about
the target without infecting the target itself, but by its communication through and with
surrounding systems.
D. FINDINGS
The amount ofwork required to secure your system is directly
proportional to the value you place on your server (Anonymous).
Advances are being made to make the Internet more secure. IPsec, which allows
a Virtual Private Network connection on IPv4 and IPv6, is a step toward a more secure
stance. Additionally, the MITRE corporation has produced a dictionary of vulnerabilities
designed to shorten the period of effectiveness for vulnerabilities. However, computer
systems will always remain vulnerable. There will always be possible exploitations in
things made in a market driven economy that values speed and ease of use over security
(Dittrich, 2000). The number of new applications and systems, along with all the possible
connections between them is rapidly increasing. No company or organization, not even
Microsoft with over 40,000 employees, has all the possible expertise in the world in
computer programming or hardware - there will always be more expertise outside than
inside a product. Vulnerabilities will always be found in new and existing applications,
mainly if a portion of the populace is motivated to find vulnerabilities. It is almost
impossible for a company to test completely all the parameters of a released product, and
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vulnerabilities will be found in ways a company couldn't prognosticate. To exploit these
vulnerabilities, experts will continue to program scripts, for whatever reason, that will
eventually find their way into being developed as open source tools.
Once a vulnerability is discovered and a tool is written, the effectiveness of the
tool follows a life cycle pattern. Initially effective, as the tool gains notoriety, its own
fame works against itself and defenses are developed to counter its effectiveness.
However, a vulnerability is never completely blocked and could have resurgence due to
the expanding pool ofnew systems and as new vulnerabilities take center stage.
Attackers have a wide range of ways to attack using open source tools. They also
have a variety of ways to find their targets. They can search methodically to find a
specific organization or perform a wide sweep for systems responding to a vulnerability.
Open source tools help in the search and attacking of computer systems. Sophisticated
attacks still require skill, however open source tools carry some expertise of their coder
inherently, which makes systems vulnerable to attackers that otherwise wouldn't be able
to threaten it.
Open source tools are easy to find on the Internet. There are a multitude of
commercially sponsored, professional sites that compete to provide the best and most
recent tools and vulnerability announcements. A potential attacker can also follow the
advisories of security organizations to get a good idea of which tools would be currently
effective on systems that might not be security conscious. Effective open source tools are
widely advertised and gain quick notoriety through the Internet; several sites even have
"vulnerabilities of the day" (www.securitvfocus.com ).
74
There are hundreds of new vulnerabilities discovered every year. Accordingly,
the number of attacks has also increased every year. (CERT, 2000). Less and less ability
is needed to use them effectively The more popular the application, the more probable
that a vulnerability will be discovered due to the higher percentage of people searching
for a weakness. As the Internet grows, so will the threats, and more and more people will
become attackers or unknowing helpers of attackers through their own vulnerabilities.
Open source tools are the resumes of a new breed of popular figures. The
motivation of fame and reputation keep people toiling to exploit weaknesses and develop
tools. Additionally, there appears to be a trend of substantial testing of the open source
tool before its release - in order to protect their reputation and please their "fans".
Quality products are demanded and certain programmers have a reputation of putting out
quality tools.
Open source tools will have an increasing impact on the security of the Internet
due to its fantastic growth and the fact that the "emphasis on security is almost always on
the end user" (Manjoo, 2000). As more and more of people's lives are wired into the
Internet, more and more security vulnerabilities will exist. Open source tools will always
be with us as long as the Internet continues its fantastic growth. As Mr. Dittrich notes,
there are over 2 1 million new hosts every month. But more importantly, there are not 2
1
million new sysadmins every month - and the difference between the two is very
important to the security of the Internet and the effectiveness of open source tools.
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APPENDIX A
Top 50 Security Tools
The following is the text version of a web site at www.insecure.org outlining the
survey conducted by Fyodor:
In May/June of 2000, we conducted a survey of 1200 Nmap users from the nmap-hackers
mailing list to determine their favorite security tools. Each respondant could list up to 5.
I was so impressed by the list they created that I am putting the top 50 up here where
everyone can benefit from them. I think anyone in the security field would be well
advised to go over the list and investigate any tools they are unfamiliar with. I also plan
to point newbies to this page whenever they write me saying "I do not know where to
start".
Respondents were allowed to list open source or commercial tools on any platform.
Commercial tools are noted as such in the list below.
I may change this list occasionally as new tools are created and others fade into obscurity
due to security enhancements becoming mainstream. Or maybe I'll just have another
survey next year.
Also note that many of the descriptions in this list were taken from the Debian package
descriptions, the Freshmeat descriptions, or from the home pages of the application. I
didn't count any votes for Nmap because the survey was taken on an Nmap mailing list.
Without further ado, here is the list (starting with the most popular):
Nessus http://www.nessus.org/
Description: Remote network security auditor, the client The Nessus Security Scanner is
a security auditing tool. It makes possible to test security modules in an attempt to find
vulnerable spots that should be fixed. . It is made up of two parts: a server, and a client.
The server/daemon, nessusd, is in charge of the attacks, whereas the client, nessus,
interferes with the user through nice XI 1/GTK+ interface. . This package contains the
GTK+ 1 .2 client, which exists in other forms and on other platforms, too.
Netcat http:/'www.10pht.com/~weld/netcat/
Note: This is an unofficial site
Description: TCP/IP Swiss army knife A simple Unix utility which reads and writes data
across network connections using TCP or UDP protocol. It is designed to be a reliable
"back-end" tool that can be used directly or easily driven by other programs and scripts.
At the same time it is a feature-rich network debugging and exploration tool, since it can
create almost any kind of connection you would need and has several interesting built-in
capabilities.
Tcpdump http://www.tcpdump . org/
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Description: A powerful tool for network monitoring and data acquisition This program
allows you to dump the traffic on a network. It can be used to print out the headers of
packets on a network interface that matches a given expression. You can use this tool to
track down network problems, to detect "ping attacks" or to monitor the network
activities.
Snort http://www.snort.org/
Description: flexible packet sniffer/logger that detects attacks Snort is a libpcap-based
packet sniffer/logger which can be used as a lightweight network intrusion detection
system. It features rules based logging and can perform content searching/matching in
addition to being used to detect a variety of other attacks and probes, such as buffer
overflows, stealth port scans, CGI attacks, SMB probes, and much more. Snort has a real-
time alerting capability, with alerts being sent to syslog, a separate "alert" file, or even to
a Windows computer via Samba.
Saint http://www.wwdsi.com/saint/
Description: SAINT (Security Administrator's Integrated Network Tool) is a security
assessment tool based on SATAN. Features include scanning through a firewall, updated
security checks from CERT & CLAC bulletins, 4 levels of severity (red, yellow, brown, &
green) and a feature rich HTML interface.
Ethereal http://ethereal.zing.org/
Description: Network traffic analyzer Ethereal is a network traffic analyzer, or "sniffer",
for Unix and Unix-like operating systems. It uses GTK+, a graphical user interface
library, and libpcap, a packet capture and filtering library.
Whisker http://www.wiretrip.net/rfp/p/doc.asp?id=2 1 &iface=2
Description: Rain.Forest.Puppy's CGI vulnerability scanner
Internet Security Scanner http ://www. iss.net/
Note: This tool costs significant $$$ to use, and does not come with source code.
Description: A popular commercial network security scanner.
Abacus Portsentry http://www.psionic.com/abacus/portsentry/
Description: Portscan detection daemon PortSentry has the ability to detect
portscans(including stealth scans) on the network interfaces of your machine. Upon alarm
it can block the attacker via hosts.deny, dropped route or firewall rule. It is part of the
Abacus program suite. . Note: If you have no idea what a port/stealth scan is, I'd
recommend to have a look at http://www.psionic.com/abacus/portsentry/ before installing




Description: A suite of powerful for sniffing networks for passwords and other
information. Includes sophisticated techniques for defeating the "protection" ofnetwork
switchers.
Tripwire http://www.tripwire.com/
Note: Depending on usage, this tool may have expensive licensing fees associated with
it.
Description: A file and directory integrity checker. Tripwire is a tool that aids system
administrators and users in monitoring a designated set of files for any changes. Used
with system files on a regular (e.g., daily) basis, Tripwire can notify system




Note: This tool costs significant $$$ to use, and does not come with source code. A
powerful demo version is available for testing.
Description: Another popular commercial scanner
Hping2 http://www.kyuzz.org/antirez/hping/
Description: hping2 is a network tool able to send custom ICMP/UDP/TCP packets and
to display target replies like ping does with ICMP replies. It handles fragmentation and
arbitrary packet body and size, and can be used to transfer files under supported
protocols. Using hping2, you can: test firewall rules, perform [spoofed] port scanning,
test net performance using different protocols, packet size, TOS (type of service), and
fragmentation, do path MTU discovery, tranfer files (even between really Fascist firewall
rules), perform traceroute-like actions under different protocols, fingerprint remote OSs,
audit a TCP/IP stack, etc. hping2 is a good tool for learning TCP/IP.
SARA http ://www-arc .com/sara/
Description: The Security Auditor's Research Assistant (SARA) is a third generation
security analysis tool that is based on the SATAN model which is covered by the GNU
GPL-like open license. It is fostering a collaborative environment and is updated
periodically to address latest threats.
Sniffit http://reptile.rug.ac.be/~coder/sniffit/sniffit.html
Description: packet sniffer and monitoring tool sniffit is a packet sniffer for
TCP/UDP/ICMP packets, sniffit is able to give you very detailed technical info on these
packets (SEC, ACK, TTL, Window, ...) but also packet contents in different formats (hex
or plain text, etc. ).
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SATAN http://www.fish.com/satan/
Description: Security Auditing Tool for Analysing Networks This is a powerful tool for
analyzing networks for vulnerabilities created for sysadmins that cannot keep a constant
look at bugtraq, rootshell and the like.
IPFilter http://coombs.anu.edu.au/ipfilter/
Description: IP Filter is a TCP/IP packet filter, suitable for use in a firewall environment.
To use, it can either be used as a loadable kernel module or incorporated into your UNIX
kernel; use as a loadable kernel module where possible is highly recommended. Scripts
are provided to install and patch system files, as required.
iptables/netfilter/ipchains/ipfwadm http://netfilter.kernelnotes.org/
Description: IP packet filter administration for 2.4.X kernels Iptables is used to set up,
maintain, and inspect the tables of IP packet filter rules in the Linux kernel. The iptables
tool also supports configuration of dynamic and static network address translation.
Firewalk http ://www.packetfactory.net/Proj ects/Firewalk/
Description: Firewalking is a technique developed by MDS and DHG that employs
traceroute-like techniques to analyze IP packet responses to determine gateway ACL
filters and map networks. Firewalk the tool employs the technique to determine the filter
rules in place on a packet forwarding device. The newest version of the tool,
firewalk/GTK introduces the option of using a graphical interface and a few bug fixes.
Strobe http://www.insecure.0rg/nmap/index.html#0ther
Description: A "Classic" high-speed TCP port scanner
LOpht Crack http://www.10pht.com/10phtcrack/
Note: No source code is included (except in research version) and there is a $100
registration fee.
Description: LOphtCrack is an NT password auditing tool. It will compute NT user
passwords from the cryptographic hashes that are stored by the NT operation system.
LOphtcrack can obtain the hashes through many sources (file, network sniffing, registry,
etc) and it has numerous methods of generating password guesses (dictionary, brute
force, etc).
John The Ripper http://www.openwall.com/iohn/
Description: An active password cracking tool John, normally called John the ripper, is a
tool to find weak passwords of your users.
Hunt http://www.cri.ez/kra/index.html#HUNT
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Description: Advanced packet sniffer and connection intrusion. Hunt is a program for
intruding into a connection, watching it and resetting it. . Note that hunt is operating on
Ethernet and is best used for connections which can be watched through it. However, it is
possible to do something even for hosts on another segments or hosts that are on switched
ports.
OpenSSH / SSH http://www.openssh.com/
http://www.ssh.com/commerce/index.html
Note: The ssh.com version cost money for some uses, but source code is available.
Description: Secure rlogin/rsh/rcp replacement (OpenSSH) OpenSSH is derived from
OpenBSD's version of ssh, which was in turn derived from ssh code from before the time
when ssh's license was changed to be non-free. Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for
logging into a remote machine and for executing commands on a remote machine. It
provides secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure
network. XI 1 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the
secure channel. It is intended as a replacement for rlogin, rsh and rep, and can be used to
provide rdist, and rsync with a secure communication channel.
tcp wrappers ftp://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/securiry/index.html
Description: Wietse Venema's TCP wrappers library Wietse Venema's network logger,
also known as TCPD or LOGTCP. . These programs log the client host name of
incoming telnet, ftp, rsh, rlogin, finger etc. requests. Security options are: access control
per host, domain and/or service; detection of host name spoofing or host address
spoofing; booby traps to implement an early-warning system.
Ntop http://www.ntop.org/
Description: display network usage in top-like format ntop is a Network Top program. It
displays a summary ofnetwork usage by machines on your network in a format
reminicent of the unix top utility. . It can also be run in web mode, which allows the
display to be browsed with a web browser.
traceroute/ping/telnet http://www.linux.com/
Description: These are utilities that virtually all UNIX boxes already have. In fact, even
Windows NT has them ( but the traceroute command is called tracert ).
NAT (NetBIOS http://www.tux.org/pub/security/secnet/tools/natlO/
Auditing Tool)
Note: This is an unofficial download site.
Description: The NetBIOS Auditing Tool (NAT) is designed to explorethe NETBIOS
file-sharing services offered by the target system. It implements a stepwise approach to




Description: A portscan detecting tool Scanlogd is a daemon written by Solar Designer
to detect portscan attacks on your maschine.
Sam Spade http ://samspade.org/t/
http://www.samspade.org/
Description: Online tools for investigating IP addresses and tracking down spammers.
NFR http://www.nfr.com/
Note: Source code was once freely available but I do not know if this is still the case.
Some usage may cost money.
Description: A commercial sniffing application for creating intrusion detection systems.
Source code was at one time available, but I do not know if that is still the case.
logcheck http://www.psionic.com/abacus/logcheck/
Description: Mails anomalies in the system logfiles to the administrator Logcheck is part
of the Abacus Project of security tools. It is a program created to help in the processing of
UNIX system logfiles generated by the various Abacus Project tools, system daemons,
Wietse Venema's TCP Wrapper and Log Daemon packages, and the Firewall Toolkit©
by Trusted Information Systems Inc.(TIS). . Logcheck helps spot problems and security
violations in your logfiles automatically and will send the results to you in e-mail. This
program is free to use at any site. Please read the disclaimer before you use any of this
software.
Perl http://www.perl.org/
Description: A very powerful scripting language which is often used to create "exploits"
for the purpose of verifying security vulnerabilities. Of course, it is also used for all sorts
of other things.
Ngrep http://www.packetfactory.net/Proi ects/ngrep/
Description: grep for network traffic ngrep strives to provide most ofGNU grep's
common features, applying them to the network layer, ngrep is a pcap-aware tool that
will allow you to specify extended regular expressions to match against data payloads of
packets. It currently recognizes TCP, UDP and ICMP across Ethernet, PPP, SLIP and
null interfaces, and understands bpf filter logic in the same fashion as more common
packet sniffing tools, such as tcpdump and snoop.
Cheops http://www.marko.net/cheops/
Description: A GTK based network "swiss-army-knife" Cheops gives a simple interface
to most network utilities, maps local or remote networks and can show OS types of the
machines on the network.
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Vetescan http://www.self-evident.com/
Description: Vetescan is a bulk vulnerability scanner which contains programs to check
for and/or exploit many remote network security exploits that are known for Windows or
UNIX. It includes various programs for doing different kinds of scanning. Fixes for
vulnerablities are included along with the exploits.
Retina http://www.eeye.com/html/Products/Retina.html
Note: Commercial product with no source code available. A demo binary is available for
testing.
Description: A commercial security scanner by the great guys at eeye.
Libnet http://www.packetfactory.net/libnet/
Description: Routines for the construction and handling of network packets, libnet
provides a portable framework for low-level network packet writing and handling.
.
Libnet features portable packet creation interfaces at the IP layer and link layer, as well as
a host of supplementary functionality. Still in it's infancy however, the library is evolving
quite a bit. Additional functionality and stability are added with each release. . Using
libnet, quick and simple packet assembly applications can be whipped up with little
effort. With a bit more time, more complex programs can be written (Traceroute and ping
were easily rewritten using libnet and libpcap).
Crack / Libcrack http://www.users.dircon.co.uk/~crypto/
Description: Crack 5 is an update version of Alec Muffett's classiclocal password
cracker. Traditionally these allowed any user of a system to crack the /etc/passwd and
determine the passwords of other users (or root) on the system. Modem systems require
you to obtain read access to /etc/shadow in order to perform this. It is still a good idea for
sysadmins to run a cracker occasionally to verify that all users have strong passwords.
Cerberus Internet Scanner http://www.cerberus-infosec.co.uk/cis.shtml
Description: CIS is a free security scanner written and maintained by Cerberus
Information Security, Ltd and is designed to help administrators locate and fix security
holes in their computer systems. Runs on Windows NT or 2000. No source code is
provided.
Swatch http://www.stanford.edu/~atkins/swatch/
Description: Swatch was originally written to actively monitor messages as they were
written to a log file via the UNIX syslog utility. It has multiple methods of alarming, both
visually and by triggering events. The perfect tools for a master loghost. This is a beta
release of version 3.0, so please use it with caution. The code is still slightly ahead of the




Description: The OpenBSD project produces a FREE, multi-platform 4.4BSD-based
UNIX-like operating system. Our efforts place emphasis on portability, standardization,
correctness, security, and cryptography. OpenBSD supports binary emulation of most
programs from SVR4 (Solaris), FreeBSD, Linux, BSDI, SunOS, and HPUX.
Nemesis http://celerity.bartoli.org/nemesis/
Description: The Nemesis Project is designed to be acommandline-based, portable
human IP stack for UNIX/Linux. The suite is broken down by protocol, and should allow
for useful scripting of injected packet streams from simple shell scripts.
LSOF ftp://vic.cc.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/lsof/
Description: List open files. Lsof is a Unix-specific diagnostic tool. Its name stands for
LiSt Open Files, and it does just that. It lists information about any files that are open by
processes current running on the system. The binary is specific to kernel version 2.2
Lids http://www.turbolinux.com.cn/lids/
Description: The LIDS is an intrusion detection/defense system inLinux kernel. The goal
is to protect linux systems against root intrusions, by disabling some system calls in the
kernel itself. As you sometimes need to administrate the system, you can disable LIDS
protection.
IPTraf http://cebu.mozcom.com/riker/iptraf/
Description: Interactive Colorful LP LAN Monitor IPTraf is an ncurses-based EP LAN
monitor that generates various network statistics including TCP info, UDP counts, ICMP
and OSPF information, Ethernet load info, node stats, EP checksum errors, and others.
.
Note that since 2.0.0 IPTraf requires a kernel >= 2.2
IPLog http://oink.sourceforge.net/
Description: iplog is a TCP/IP traffic logger. Currently, it is capable of logging TCP,
UDP and ICMP traffic, iplog 2.0 is a complete re-write of iplog 1.x, resulting in greater
portability and better performance, iplog 2.0 contains all the features of iplog 1.x as well
as several new ones. Major new features include a packet filter and detection ofmore
scans and attacks. It currently runs on Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD, BSDI and Solaris.
Ports to other systems, as well as any contributions at all, are welcome at this time.
Fragrouter http://www.anzen.com/research/nidsbench/
Description: Fragrouter is aimed at testing the correctness of a NEDS,according to the
specific TCP/IP attacks listed in the Secure Networks NEDS evasion paper. [2] Other
NEDS evasion toolkits which implement these attacks are in circulation among hackers or
publically available, and it is assumed that they are currently being used to bypass NEDSs
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Queso http://www.apostols.org/proiectz/queso/
Note: A couple of the OS detection tests in Queso were later incorporated into Nmap . A
paper we wrote on OS detection is available here .




Description: The GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) is a complete and free replacement for
PGP, developed in Europe. Because it does not use IDEA or RSA it can be used without
any restrictions. GnuPG is a RFC2440 (OpenPGP) compliant application. PGP is the
famous encryption program which helps secure your data from eavesdroppers and other
risks.
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